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What Red Lines, If Any, Do the Lisbon Judgments of European Constitutional Courts Draw for Future EU Integration?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 March 2019

Extract

The lingering European financial crisis continues to threaten the Eurozone and, in the opinion of German Chancellor Angela Merkel, the very survival of the European idea. With this apocalyptic rhetoric, it is easily forgotten that only nine years earlier Europe overcame a predicament that was, at the time, equally described as the most challenging in its history. Two failed referendums in Member States of the European Union (Member States)—namely, in France and the Netherlands—stopped the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (Constitutional Treaty) in its tracks and led to an extended “period of reflection” for Europe's leaders. From this emerged a reboot of the Constitutional Treaty, now dubbed the Treaty of Lisbon, with few substantial changes, but more success throughout the ratification procedures. The final hurdle presented itself in the form of institutionally strong Constitutional Courts (CC) and Tribunals (CT) of the European Member States. Of these, the following were at one time or another seized with complaints against the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty: The Austrian Verfassungsgerichtshof (Austrian CC), the Belgian CC, the Ústavní soud České republiky (Czech CC), the French Conseil Constitutionnel (French CC), the German Bundesverfassungsgericht (German CC), the Hungarian CC, the Latvijas Republikas Satversmes tiesa (Latvian CC), the Polish Trybunał Konstytucyjny (Polish CT), and the Tribunal Constitucional de España (Spanish CT).

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Copyright © 2014 by German Law Journal GbR 

References

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177 Which could lead to infringement proceedings under Article 258 TFEU. See Wendel supra note 15, at 129.Google Scholar

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179 Mangold v. Helm, ECJ Case No. C-144/04 (Nov. 22, 2005).Google Scholar

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191 Id. at 167 (describing it as an unnecessary detour that has yielded little fruit).Google Scholar

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210 Polish, CT, Lisbon, supra note 13, at para. 2.2.Google Scholar

211 French, CC, Loi relative à la bioéthique, supra note 200, at paras. 4–7.Google Scholar

212 Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizens art. 11 (1789).Google Scholar

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217 A phenomenon that to Pedro Cruz Villalón attributes to globalization and Europeanization. Pedro Cruz Villalón, Grundlagen und Grundzüge staatlichen Verfassungsrecht: Vergleich, in 1 Handbuch Ius Publicum Europaeum 772 (Armin von Bogdandy et al. eds., 2007).Google Scholar

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225 Case C-6/64, Flaminio Costa v. ENEL, 1964 E.C.R. 585. See Alfred Grosser, The Federal Constitutional Court's Lisbon Case: Germany's “Sonderweg” – An Outsider's Perspective, 10 German L.J. 1264 (2009); Case C-314/85, Foto-Frost, 1987 E.C.R. 4199.Google Scholar

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227 See Beck, , supra note 57, at 480.Google Scholar

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229 See Beck, , supra note 57, at 485.Google Scholar

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233 See Möllers, supra note 186, at 167.Google Scholar

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235 See Tomuschat, , supra note 9, at 1259 (deeming the Lisbon Judgment a “political manifesto”).Google Scholar

236 A recent example is the equal treatment of same sex couples in tax matters. See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG - Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 2 BvR 909/06, 2 BvR 1981/06, 2 BvR 288/07, 2013 NJW 2257 (May 7, 2013).Google Scholar

237 See Möllers, Christoph, Was ein Parlament ist, entscheiden die Richter, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, July 16, 2009.Google Scholar

238 See Grosser, , supra note 225, at 1263 (attesting the German CC a general loss of self-restraint altogether).Google Scholar

239 See Favoreu, Louis, La Politique Saisie par le Droit 30 (1988).Google Scholar

240 Adapted from: Peter Bucher, Der Parlamentarische Rat 1948–1949. Akten und Protokolle, Volume 2, in Der Verfassungskonvent auf Herrenchiemsee 580 (1981).Google Scholar

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