In the past few years, it has become a sort of cliché to state that psychiatry is in a crisis. In particular, it has been repeatedly argued that: (a) psychiatric diagnoses are invalid; (b) psychiatric research has not progressed significantly (in particular, it has not been able to identify “the cause” of schizophrenia, depression or bipolar disorder); (c) psychiatric treatments are of limited value, and their widespread use has not been able to reduce the incidence of mental disorders. This perception of crisis has been at least in part generated by an identification of mainstream psychiatry with the neo-kraepelinian paradigm, so that the crisis of confidence in that paradigm has expanded into a crisis of confidence in the psychiatric discipline. According to Kuhn, the crisis of confidence in a paradigm is accompanied by a period of “extraordinary science”, marked by a proliferation of competing methodologies, the proposition of a variety of divergent solutions for the problem defining the crisis, and the recourse to philosophy and to debate over fundamentals of the discipline. The crisis of confidence in the neo-kraepelinian paradigm has generated such a period, in which we are all now immersed. In this presentation, I will summarize the main components of the neo-kraepelinian paradigm; I will illustrate why that paradigm has failed, or at least has lost people's confidence; and will summarize the main elements which are emerging in the current period of “extraordinary science”.