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Suspension as Spandrel

  • Ernest Sosa (a1)

Abstract

A telic virtue epistemology was presupposed in our treatment of insight and understanding. What follows will lay out the main elements of that telic theory and explore how it provides an epistemology of suspension.

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References

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Friedman, J. (2017). ‘Why Suspend Judging?Noûs 51, 302–26.
Friedman, J. (2019). ‘Inquiry and Belief.’ Noûs 53, 296315.
Greco, J. (2010). Achieving Knowledge: A Virtue-Theoretic Account of Epistemic Normativity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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Suspension as Spandrel

  • Ernest Sosa (a1)

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