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In Defense of Epistemic Relativism

  • Ram Neta

Abstract

In Fear of Knowledge, Paul Boghossian argues against various forms of epistemic relativism. In this paper, I criticize Boghossian’s arguments against a particular variety of relativism. I then argue in favor of a thesis that is very similar to this variety of relativism.

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Boghossian, Paul. 2006. Fear of Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Feldman, Richard. 1988. “Having Evidence.” Pp. 83104 in Austin, D. F., ed. Philosophical Analysis. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Feyerabend, Paul. 1993. Against Method. 3rd ed. New York: Verso.
Kripke, Saul. 1982. Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Shapin, Steven and Simon, Schaffer. 1985. Leviathan and the Air-Pump: Hobbes, Boyle, and the Experimental Life. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Williamson, Timothy. 2000. Knowledge and its Limits. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

In Defense of Epistemic Relativism

  • Ram Neta

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