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Conceptions of Epistemic Value
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 29 June 2021
Abstract
This paper defends a conception of epistemic value that I call the “Simpliciter Conception.” On it, epistemic value is a kind of value simpliciter and being of epistemic value implies being of value simpliciter. I defend this conception by criticizing two others, what I call the Formal Conception and the Hybrid Conception. While those conceptions may be popular among epistemologists, I argue that they fail to explain why anyone should care that things are of epistemic value and naturally undercuts disputes about what is of epistemic value. I end by sketching and locating my conception within some increasingly popular views in meta-normativity.
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