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HOW TO PERCEIVE REASONS

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 February 2016

Abstract

This paper deals with the question whether, and to what extent, perceptions can provide a justification for our empirical beliefs. In particular, it addresses the issue of whether they need to be conceptualized by a subject in order to play a justificatory role. It is argued that the conditions under which a subject can have perceptual representational contents and those under which those representational contents can play a justificatory role differ. The upshot is that perception can provide justification only for the beliefs of those creatures who have a conceptual apparatus and are therefore in a position passively to exercise it in perception, even though also creatures devoid of concepts can and often do have perceptual representations.

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Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2016 

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