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HOW GIFTS AND GAMBLES PRESERVE JUSTICE

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 April 2013

Andrew Williams
Andrew Williams*
Affiliation:
ICREA–Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Spainandrew.williams@icrea.cat
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Abstract

This paper examines G. A. Cohen's final criticism of Ronald Dworkin's theory of equality of resources, which targets its treatment of inequalities that arise when some individuals make luckier choices than others make. Rebutting Cohen's argument that such option luck inequalities fail to be just in an unqualified sense, the paper argues that choice does not merely render inequality legitimate but instead can sometimes make inequality just. It also examines the relationship between Cohen's criticism and the conception of equality developed in his earlier influential paper, ‘On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice’.

Type
Articles
Information
Economics & Philosophy , Volume 29 , Issue 1 , March 2013 , pp. 65 - 85
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2013

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