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Economics & Philosophy Economics & Philosophy

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Stable and unstable choices

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  21 February 2019

Anders Herlitz
Anders Herlitz
Affiliation:
Institute for Futures Studies, Stockholm, Sweden
Corresponding
E-mail address:
andersherlitz@gmail.com
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Abstract

This paper introduces a condition for rational choice that states that accepting decision methods and normative theories that sometimes entail that the act of choosing a maximal alternative renders this alternative non-maximal is irrational. The paper illustrates how certain distributive theories that ascribe importance to what the status quo is violate this condition and argues that they thereby should be rejected.

Keywords

basic contraction consistency distributive theory normative invariance prioritarianism rational choice
Type
Article
Information
Economics & Philosophy , Volume 36 , Issue 1 , March 2020 , pp. 113 - 125
Copyright
© Cambridge University Press 2019 

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