The link between law and morality has been hotly debated by lawyers and philosophers over the years. This article takes as its starting point the assumption at the beginning of the twentieth century that it was the responsibility of courts and their judges to enforce and promote Christian morality. During the course of the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries that assumption has been comprehensively undone. This article examines the key points in the development of judicial approaches to law, morality and religion that have led to a completely different approach to such questions in the courts today.

The Clergy Discipline Measure has been in force since 1 January 2006. The Measure provides a structure for dealing with formal complaints of misconduct against members of the clergy except in relation to matters involving doctrine, ritual or ceremonial, which continue to be governed by the Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction Measure 1963. This article looks at how the Measure has worked in practice, and considers amendments to the Measure that have recently been made.

Reconciling conflict between religious freedoms and non-religious human rights is a subject that has begun to affect many countries as they have become more liberal, multicultural and secular. The law relevant to the subject is currently developing at a fast pace, and is of particular interest in England and Wales given the historical position that Christianity has had within the establishment – the monarchy, Parliament and the law. This article charts the development of the law in these areas from an era of officially Protestant uniformity to the current plural and tolerant society. The fast pace of development, particularly since the end of the Second World War, is shown through examination of the development of the law in the fields of racial discrimination, discrimination on the grounds of sexuality, and religious freedom and discrimination. To all intents and purposes, the law has now become neutral towards religion and belief and provides an enlarged space where, subject only to legitimate interference for the protection of that freedom and the rule of law, all are free to adhere to their own faith and belief system.

This lecture – delivered before the Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013 became law – discusses three conceptions of the relation of Church and state: those of Richard Hooker, Thomas Warburton and Samuel Taylor Coleridge. Hooker and Coleridge bind Church and state together more closely than does Warburton in The Alliance between Church and State (1736). It is argued is that the Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act points to an increasingly Warburtonian, superficial, pragmatic understanding of the relation between state and Church, which can all too easily be pulled apart. The subtler positions of Hooker and Coleridge are excluded. The ‘quadruple lock’, by which the Government affirms that it protects the position of the Church of England in upholding a traditional doctrine of marriage, has been put in place as promised, but the Act marks a significant step on the road to the disestablishment of the Church of England.

Same-sex marriage is legal or likely to be legalised in many Western nations. One important safeguard invariably incorporated in the legislation providing for same-sex marriage has been an exemption for religious ministers who object to solemnising such marriages. Another category of potential objectors consists of marriage registrars, commissioners or celebrants employed or appointed by the state. By contrast, an accommodation grounded in the right of religious freedom and conscience for these governmental celebrants has not been granted. This article examines the introduction of same-sex marriage in three jurisdictions – England and Wales, New Zealand and Canada. It analyses the precise ambit of the exemption for religious celebrants, considers the vulnerability of such exemptions to future legal challenge and questions the validity of denying free exercise accommodation to state-appointed celebrants.

In the increasingly complex conjunction of law and religion, one of the most crucial questions concerns the privileged place of religion among other convictional positions which are protected under Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights. This article argues the need for a trans-disciplinary approach to the question of definitions, importing insights from philosophy, sociology of law and neo-pragmatism. The aim is to elucidate the view that defining is both an art (in the discursive construction of its object) and a form of politics (as a regulative technology, through which the actual flux and complexity of human reality is brought under control). The question of what religion is (the ontological question) should be acknowledged as a jurisprudential red herring.

This article deals with the relation between God and the secular legal systems of Western liberal democracies. It provides a normative argument for the compatibility of God and secular legal reasoning. In our age, in which believing in God is no longer socially axiomatic and the right to religious freedom protects all kinds of theistic and non-theistic religious beliefs, creeds and first philosophies, it seems contrary to religious neutrality for secular legal systems to single out God. This article instead argues that, although God and religion are inextricably intertwined, they affect the legal system in different ways because they are ontologically different. God cannot be reduced to a mere component of theistic religion. A proper understanding of secularisation might call for keeping God outside the legal system but not for driving God out of the public sphere of democratic societies. Secular legal systems are not atheist legal systems; they are legal systems ‘without religion’ but not ‘without God’. Secularisation implies some degree of minimal recognition of God as a metalegal concept. The specific degree of recognition of God appropriate for any given political community depends on its cultural and communitarian identity and should be subject to the rules of democratic procedures and majorities. This is the metalegal God.

Christians have had centuries of experience with a wide variety of synods or councils, and the establishment by Pope Paul VI in 1965 of the Synod of Bishops is one of the latest examples. It is already clear that with Pope Francis the Synod will increase its already great impact on the life and mission of the Church. This article will begin by presenting the current canon law governing the Synod, mainly from the 1983 Code of Canon Law. Particular attention will then be given to the ecclesial dynamics within which the Synod operates. This will involve considering papal primacy, episcopal collegiality, Ecumenical Councils, the College of Cardinals and the Roman Curia. While accepting that the Synod must be understood on its own terms, the concluding reflections will illustrate the need to state as a matter of theology and of history the foundations on which synodality and conciliarity rest.

Lawyers and priests are both vested in their office by a licensing authority and take oaths to obey the law, whether civil or ecclesiastical, that governs. Within these similar settings, the appropriate authority may need to judge disobedience by the lawyer or priest. If obedience is not enforced, respect for the law will decline and lawlessness ensues. In the Episcopal Church, it is black-letter law that only the baptised may receive communion. Notwithstanding the law, priests in ever-increasing numbers are inviting all to the table. Against what standard is such conduct to be judged? The Constitution and Canons are silent. Is the standard therefore to be merely the fact that the priest thinks he or she is following the dictates of the Holy Spirit? Or is there a real standard for judgment? Perhaps the gloss around civil disobedience and the rules of professional responsibility of lawyers may provide a more objective guide. This article discusses the debate over open table and the current black-letter law, and considers ecclesiastical disobedience under the guidance of the standards for legitimate civil disobedience. In addition, it considers the apparent desire of the bishops for the best of all possible worlds – having a law that the greater Church will appreciate, but then not enforcing it. The result may be more table fellowship but also anarchy.

The faculty jurisdiction of the Church of England pre-dates planning law by several centuries. It is the means by which the diocesan bishop, through his chancellor and in his consistory court, ensures that the sacred buildings of the diocese and their contents are compliant with the canon law, doctrine and ecclesiology of the Church of England. During the latter part of the last century, the effective operation of the faculty jurisdiction contributed to the continuing exclusion of churches of the Church of England from the need for listed building control. The rationale is that the faculty jurisdiction provides a level of protection for the church's built heritage equivalent to local authority protection, but uniquely tailored for the sacred purpose of the buildings and the evolving needs of individual worshipping communities. A balance constantly needs to be struck which respects the rigour required of both ecclesiastical and secular authorities (with their competing but complementary demands), but is not so cumbersome that it deters and frustrates parishes and other interested persons and bodies from engaging with it.

The requirement for an oath of canonical obedience (or due obedience) pre-dates the Reformation although a printed text has so far only been traced back to 1637. It is taken by every bishop, priest and deacon, as well as by deaconesses and readers. There are few cases on the scope and meaning of the oath but the Privy Council case of Long v Bishop of Cape Town (1863) decided that the oath only requires obedience to such commands as the superior is otherwise by law authorised to impose. This case is still a binding authority, although difficulties arise as to its application in relation, for example, to national and diocesan regulations, policies and guidelines.

This article aims to provide an introductory historical sketch of the origins of the Church of England as a background for canon law in the present-day Anglican Communion and the Roman Catholic Church. Written by a specialist for non-specialists, it summarises the widely held view among ecclesiastical historians that if the Church of England could ever be said to have had a ‘normative’ period, it is not to be found in its formative years in the middle decades of the sixteenth century, and that, in particular, the origins of the Church of England and of what we now call ‘Anglicanism’ are not the same thing.

Earlier this year the Church Commissioners decided that the newly appointed Bishop of Bath and Wells should live in the Old Rectory, Croscombe, instead of at the historic palace in Wells. When the decision met considerable local opposition, not least in the House of Commons, the Archbishops' Council appointed a committee consisting of Mrs Mary Chapman (in the Chair), Philip Fletcher and Archdeacon Cherry Vann to consider objections. After a hearing, the committee directed that the transaction should not proceed.

The autumn of 2013 saw two landmark decisions in the Anglican churches of the British Isles. On 12 September 2013 the Governing Body of the Church in Wales voted in favour of legislation to permit the ordination of women as bishops. On 20 September 2013 it was announced that on the previous day the Revd Patricia Storey had been elected as Bishop of Meath and Kildare. She was duly consecrated on 30 November 2013 and enthroned in her two cathedrals in early December. The Scottish Episcopal Church permits the ordination of women to the episcopate, but to date none has been elected to an episcopal see.

Community lies at the heart of both church and school life in the Church of England. In some areas, church communities are sustained by families who choose to attend a particular church based on the quality of the church school in its parish. Many Voluntary Aided Church of England schools (church schools) give priority admission to parents on the basis of faith in the oversubscription criteria of their admission arrangements. While the Church stresses inclusiveness in its recommendations regarding admissions policies to church schools, where a church school is very popular and oversubscribed arguably priority must be given to parents of the faith in the school's catchment area. Otherwise parishioner children whose families regularly attend church could fail to be admitted to their local church school because of competition for places.

It is a peculiarity of the European continent that there are four independent Anglican jurisdictions side by side: the Church of England with its Diocese in Europe, The Episcopal Church, based in the United States of America, with its Convocation of Episcopal Churches in Europe, and the Lusitanian and Spanish Reformed Episcopal Churches which are extra-provincial dioceses in the Anglican Communion. Alongside these, there are the Old Catholic Churches of the Union of Utrecht, with dioceses in the Netherlands, Germany, Austria and Switzerland. All of them are in full communion with each other, but they lack a comprehensive jurisdictional structure; consequently, there are cities where two or three bishops exercise jurisdiction canonically totally separately.

The problem of sectarianism has attracted increasing attention in recent years, particularly as a feature of hate crimes in Scotland today. The current law on sectarianism is based on the common law crime of breach of the peace and on new statutory offences which cover some categories of behaviour that have been prosecuted as breach of the peace. However, ‘the Crown frequently prosecutes a wide range of behaviours as breach of the peace when there is an (arguably more apposite) statutory offence’. The regulation regarding sectarianism might also require a reappraisal of the common view that blasphemy is no longer an offence in Scottish law.