Le mythe n'est pas un phénomène qui se nourrit en quelquesorte de sa propre substance. Le phénomène du mythe entretient, au contraire, des liens particulièrement étroits avec le double univers du langage et du sacré. Entre ces trois phéno-mènes, les rapports sont multiples, et, vous le devinez, extrême-ment complexes. Il ne saurait être question d'épuiser ici un aussi vaste sujet. J'aurai atteint mon but si je paryiens à circonscrire quelques-unes des données fondamentales du problème. J'essaierai d'être clair et bref.

It is occasionally desirable to take an overview of quite a wide area of philosophy: what one loses in detail one gains in perspective. I follow this procedure in the present paper. Ia m concerned with the whole area where we indulge in practical deliberation, or where we attempt to justify some course of action we propose to follow or have followed. To do this I investigate the nature of a reason for acting and how such reasons can enter into an attempt to justify some act. It should be noticed that just having reasons for acting in some way does not entail that acting in that way is justifiable. In what follows, I speak first of reasons, later of justifications.

I shall here propose specific logical forms to express the structures of the counterfactual conditional and its cognate forms, the semifactual conditional and the undetermined conditional. Some of the proposals have been previously made in a different context by Nelson Goodman, but to my knowledge they have never been incorporated into definite, all-embracing logical schemata. Because of this failure, the astounding assertion that there is no definite logical form of the counterfactual conditional could be made.

As a centre for research in philosophy, McMaster University has added greatly to its strength and attractiveness by acquiring the papers of Bertrand Russell. He is the most voluminous, the most interesting, and—if the matter were determined by the vote of his colleagues—probably the most distinguished living philosopher. Yet to talk about the philosophy of Russell is curiously difficult, since in a sense there is no such thing. Russell has held not one but many philosophies.

It is a great pleasure to be asked to describe to philosophers the papers of Bertrand Russell. Russell's papers were acquired by McMaster University in the spring of 1968. Professor William Ready, the University Librarian, who is almost solely responsible for their acquisition, has created a special department for them in the library with ample funds for their expansion and scholarly exploitation. Before their arrival in Canada, I had had the privilege of working on the papers for a year while they were being catalogued in London. After their sale to McMaster, Professor Ready hired me as someone who knew his way in the dozens of cabinet drawers and trunks. Although my interests in the papers are primarily bibliographical and personal, I shall try to outline what philosophers, especially those with an historical interest, could find of importance in them. In doing so, I shall mention some topics of possible inquiry and suggest specific manuscripts to study in connection with them, but I shall not attempt to trace in detail the development of any of Russell's ideas. That is for philosophers to do.

« Deuxième du titre, ces Mythologiques prolongent l'enquête inaugurée dans le Cru et le cuit. Aussi, avons-nous pris soin de récapituler au début, tout en les éclairant d'un nouveau jour, les renseignements indispensables, pour qu'on puisse, sans connaître l e précédent volume, se lancer hardiment dans celui-ci qui prétend montrer que la terre de la Mythologie est ronde ».

D'où vient que « peine » signifie à la fois « punition, châtiment infligés à celui qui commet une infraction » et « affliction, fatigue, misère » (Larousse) ? Que se passe-t-il exactement quand la souffrance se métamorphose en peine ? Et si pareille mutation relevait de la fiction mythologique, ou si, tout simplement, elle appartenait à un stade révolu de l'histoire, quel sens les chrétiens pourraient-ils encore donner à la rédemption sanglante et à l'expiation sacrificielle du Christ?

Le problème du statut épistémologique de la psychanalyse et la question de son fondement et de sa place dans l'éventail des sciences humaines prennent un sens nouveau avec l'introduction des perspectives structurales auxquelles le psychanalyste français Lacan initie ses élèves depuis plus de quinze ans dans un enseignement que Ton peut bien qualifier d'ésotérique. Auparavant disséminée dans des articles qu'il n'était pas toujours facile de repérer, la pensée de Lacan nous est maintenant accessible par une plus large avenue grâce à la récente publication des Ecrits réunis de l'auteur.

This is a book built round an argument. Several variants of the argument are offered, and I shall consider but one of them. It is directed against the following act utilitarian principle:

AU: An act is right if and only if it would have best consequences (i.e. consequences at least as good as those of any alternative act open to the agent)

The argument may be freely rendered as follows. Suppose that we have an agent, Smith, in a society, S, such that the following conditions are satisfied:

C1: Smith accepts AU and attempts always to act in accordance with it

C2: Smith is rational: he understands the implications of accepting AU and applies AU correctly

C3: No other person in S accepts AU

C4: All others in S know that C1 and C2 obtain

C5: All others in S are rational: they understand the implications of Smith's accepting AU

C: All others in S are tolerant of Smith's accepting AU: they do not criticize him for acting in accordance with it

C7: Smith knows that C3 – C6 obtain

C1 – C7 collectively define the position of an act utilitarian in a non-act utilitarian society, with certain assumptions as to rationality and tolerance. Then the thesis is that under C1 – C7 Smith will sometimes fail to do the act with best consequences. His very acceptance and correct application of AU (under the other conditions) conspire to prevent the production of certain good consequences which would otherwise be possible.