This article discusses difficulties in recent works advocating differentiated rights for ethnic groups based on the vulnerability of their cultures. Concentrating on the recent works of Will Kymlicka, the author suggests that such culturalist theories are based on an anachronistic vision of the relation between ethnos and culture and underestimate the depth and extent of the pluralism we face. The author focuses on two central difficulties. One is the tendency to overplay the contrast between the vulnerability of mainstream and minority cultural groups, overestimating the importance of ethnic institutions compared to other cultural infrastructures. The other is the problem of territory. Kymlicka's theory supports a model of ethnic hegemony over particular territories. The author suggests that in an era of densely overlapping cultures a model of ethnic hegemony over territory cannot be sustained as part of a theory which takes cultural fairness seriously. The article concludes with suggestions for an alternative perspective which might allow us to address the predicaments of culturally vulnerable individuals without incurring the difficulties that culturalism entails.

Two ideologies have survived the turmoil of the twentieth century: nationalism and liberalism. It is therefore very important to confront them and to see how compatible they are. In this article the author presents and discusses the national policies advocated by the three most influential liberal schools: the neutralists, the autonomists and the nationalists.

This article examines the interrelationship between and the relative importance of individual leadership and structural power in promoting (or impeding) regime implementation. The theoretical debates on structural power and individual leadership are related to a particular case of regime implementation: the efforts of the Preparatory Commission on the International Seabed Authority and the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea to make the international seabed regime operational. The article concludes that hegemonic stability theory highlights a variable—structural power—which in this case is the key determinant of the ability to exert influence. On the other hand, hegemonic stability theory fails to establish causal links and it ignores other important variables, such as the constraints imposed by changes in the domestic environments of leading states as well as in the international environment. In the pulling and hauling of international negotiations aimed at regime implementation, individuals can and do play significant roles as structural, intellectual and, most particularly, entrepreneurial leaders.

A review of contributions to the resource conservation literature shows that sustainability problems are seen as caused by “common property.” This “tragedy of the commons” is understood as the result of the failure to assign fully property rights to individuals. The supporting assumptions and premises to these “privatarian” arguments are explicated and examined. After refuting the main premises, it is argued that the application of neoclassical assumptions and premises overlooks other legitimate forms of ownership as effective solutions to the tragedy of the commons. In revisiting other categories of ownership, the limits of privatarianism are identified and the prospects for solutions to sustainability problems are expanded.

This article explores ways of improving Canada's constitutional reform process by systematically comparing the strengths and weaknesses of the Meech Lake and Charlottetown constitutional rounds during three phases: agenda-setting, elite negotiation and ratification. The objective is to draw lessons from these experiences for future attempts to achieve formal constitutional change. The author argues that both the Meech Lake and Charlottetown processes were seriously flawed, but in rather contrasting ways. The Meech Lake process was too closed, narrowly representative and tightly controlled by government elites. The Charlottetown process was poorly managed. It lacked focus, economy and coherence in agenda-setting and selection of items for negotiation, and integration and unified leadership in its elite bargaining structures and processes. The consultative referendum used in the Charlottetown process operated successfully, but still needed organizational fine-tuning and more effective meshing with established ratification procedures. What is required is a more finely balanced and closely integrated “blended” process of parallel elite and citizen-based consultative and participatory structures operating in all phases of the constitutional process. Within this framework, the author offers a comprehensive list of proposals for addressing and overcoming the shortcomings of earlier constitutional reform efforts.

In early 1996, Canada's federal government enacted a new constitutional amending process to provide provincial and regional vetoes over future amendments. This study compares the new process with the “7 and 50” formula found in the Constitution Act, 1982. Using the Banzhaf Index as well as separate measures for the power to prevent and the power to initiate amendments, the article examines the relative influence of the provinces under the two amending formulae. As well, it examines the relative voting power of each province's citizens in any future constitutional referendum. The results show that profound changes are produced by the regional veto amending formula, and the article discusses some remedies for the most negative effects.