This article defends Block Exemption Regulations (‘BERs’) as a legitimate and effective tool for the consideration of public policy within Article 101 of the TFEU enforcement. Going against popular opinion, it argues that as the expression of a clearly defined EU-wide political consensus, BERs carry several advantages over the traditional balancing tools of Article 101(1) and (3) individual exceptions, guidelines, or balancing by the exercise of enforcement discretion. BERs offer pre-determined and transparent rules, safeguarding the independent competition authorities’ political accountability and democratic legitimacy, promoting uniformity and legal certainty, reducing compliance and enforcement costs, inviting scrutiny and debate, and fostering experimentalism and flexibility.

The article examines the legal structure and constitutional consequences of ‘Next Generation EU’ (NGEU)—the innovative recovery fund that the European Union (EU) established to address the socio-economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic. The article sheds light on the complex normative constellation that was used to erect NGEU, and explains how this was satisfactorily done within the existing Treaty framework, by resorting to current legal bases. At the same time, however, the article underlines the profound constitutional consequences that NGEU has on the EU's architecture of economic governance. To this end, the article contrasts the strategy chosen to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic to that embraced to tackle the euro-crisis a decade ago, and concludes emphasising how NGEU significantly contributes to the federalisation of the EU, endowing its fiscal union with a fiscal capacity analogous to that of other federal regimes.

In the last decade, EU competition law reached a major turning point in its history. Anti-competitive object became an elusive and unpredictable rule, which boosts the risk of false positives and has a significant chilling effect. This article analyses this metamorphosis and the social damages it is causing, and proposes an alternative conception. The article demonstrates that the emerging new concept of anti-competitive object erroneously conflates ‘contextual analysis’, which has been part of the object-inquiry from the outset, and ‘effects-analysis’, which has no role to play here. It submits that both doctrinal and policy reasons confirm that anti-competitive object should be a category-building principle of ‘judicial rule-making’ (‘definition of the definition’) and not applicable to individual arrangements directly.

In recent years, a platform economy has emerged that is dominated by undertakings such as Google, Amazon, Facebook, Apple, and Microsoft. They have established a form of private governance vis-à-vis their consumers and customers by means of standard terms that create a risk of exploitation. This trend clashes with the internal market effort of the EU that is predicated on consumer rights and fair competition to address market failures such as market power, information asymmetry, and asymmetrical contractual dependency. In this article we examine how the resulting tensions can be addressed by means of EU competition and contract law. This is based on enforcing fairness by requiring (1) the implementation of proportionality—balancing interests—and (2) respect of the duty of care, in the sense of compliance by design. Jointly this can be seen as an expression of accountability that needs to be made explicit. Apart from pre-existing case law and legislation, we take into account the December 2020 Commission proposals for platform regulation, as well as behavioural insights into consumer behaviour.

This article provides a constitutionally grounded understanding of the vexing principle of ‘national procedural autonomy’ that haunts the vindication of EU law in national court. After identifying tensions and confusion in the debate surrounding this purported principle of ‘autonomy’, the Article turns to the foundational text and structure of Union law to reconstruct the proper constitutional basis for deploying or supplanting national procedures and remedies. It further argues that much of the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union may be considered through the lens of ‘prudential avoidance’, ie the decision to avoid difficult constitutional questions surrounding the principle of conferral. As the last Part shows, a constitutional understanding of ‘national procedural authority’—not ‘autonomy’—helps clear up some persistent puzzles, and provides critical guidance for when deference to national procedures and remedies is appropriate, and when such deference is misplaced. Comparative references inform the argument along the way.

The judgment by the German Constitutional Court (‘BVerfG’) of 5 May 2020 has caused a stir all over Europe. The relationship between the BVerfG and the European Court of Justice (‘ECJ’) has never been an easy one, especially after the Solange judgment of 1974. The Solange jurisprudence has, however, not only been synonymous with conflict and rivalry but also for dialogue and, eventually, mutual respect. With the PSPP judgment, this dialogue seemed to have found an end, while by the order of 29 April 2021 the BVerfG appears to have returned to a more conciliatory tone. Nonetheless, the disruption between Karlsruhe and Luxembourg persists.

In this article, the PSPP judgment will be examined in detail, presenting it as the last step of long, contorted jurisprudence. It will be shown that the rupture that occurred in May 2020 was technically unnecessary and rather the result of deep-rooted cultural conflict with a clear economic background. The legal reasoning on both sides—that of the BVerfG and that of the PSPP judgment's most outspoken critics—is problematic at best. While for the time being the BVerfG seems to have learnt the lesson from the conflict provoked by its own judgment, the underlying, substantive conflict is still unresolved.

It will be shown that this conflict can only be solved on a political level. Thereby, cultural pre-concepts will have to be overcome. Uncompromising reliance on a national ‘popular spirit’ (Volksgeist) will not offer a way out but neither will, for the time being, exclusive reference to a European Volksgeist ignoring Member State realities. The ‘weighing and balancing’ the BVerfG has missed in the previous Weiss ECJ preliminary ruling (again on the PSPP programme) will have to take place on a far broader scale.

This article aims to map how soft law tools have complemented and supported the overall regulatory strategies implemented by European countries to counter the Covid-19 crisis (the soft law atlas), to shed light on some key topics of general interest for legal theory and practice: how soft law tools interact and complement one another including on different levels (the soft law web), how soft law tools interact and complement the sources of pandemic law (the interplay between soft and hard law), and the positive and negative impacts on governance and policy-making of soft law tools during the pandemic and beyond (soft law bright and dark sides).

The establishment of the Court of Justice of the European Union (‘CJEU’) is often still regarded today as an unequivocal success story, especially compared to the troubles experienced by kindred institutions elsewhere. For non-specialist audiences, it would even seem that its performance has only recently been cast in a more negative light, pursuant to the pushback of the German Federal Constitutional Court in the Weiss/PSPP saga. The current article aims to unpack a collection of shortcomings that have accumulated gradually and persist right up to the present, which have however not been interrogated in sufficient depth so far. It starts off with a contextual depiction of the tug-of-war between the supranational and the national judiciaries, juxtaposing the earlier confrontations with contemporary debates and controversies. Subsequently, attention is drawn to the sustained imperfections of the judicial selection and appointment process, addressing a few pervasive questions of institutional propriety. Hereafter, the article engages in a meta-analysis of ongoing discussions on the quality of the case law, testing the veracity of popular contentions pertaining to its constant variability. Lastly, it canvasses the pressures and agitations internal to the CJEU that have become increasingly manifest since the creation of the Court of First Instance. Overall, this fourfold re-appraisal aims to put back on record some of the B-sides on the sountrack of the new legal order, so as to compensate for the lack of airplay they have received hitherto.

This article explores the European Parliament's July 2018 non-legislative resolution proposing to the European Commission a directive for facilitating social enterprise companies’ cross-border activities. The proposal is first situated within the context of the social economy and how the sector has grown in importance to European integration. The proposal and the European Commission's response are then examined. Although the European Commission was not convinced that Member States would be amenable to the proposal, a consensus may already exist that is sufficient to garner their support. Even if this prediction is wrong, however, it is argued that there are reasons to surmise that the proposal will likely be reassessed and ultimately successful at some future point. Finally, the proposal is viewed with a reflexive harmonisation lens. Through the analysis, regulatory issues are identified, and a solution is then suggested.

The binding legal force that the Charter acquired with the Treaty of Lisbon has led some national constitutional courts to adopt an entirely new approach to EU fundamental rights. Most notably, the Austrian Constitutional Court, the Italian Constitutional Court, and the German Federal Constitutional Court have explicitly made the Charter a yardstick of constitutional review. This article compares and contrasts the approaches of these three courts to the Charter. It shows that the strategies of the Austrian and German Constitutional Courts have many characteristics in common, including that national constitutional rights are treated as a primary source and the Charter as a mere secondary benchmark in the majority of cases. The most distinctive feature of the Italian Constitutional Court's strategy is that it mainly aims to prevent ordinary courts from circumventing constitutionality refences by directly applying the Charter. The article concludes by arguing that it has many advantages when national constitutional courts adopt the Charter as a yardstick of constitutional review. It is for the constitutional courts and the CJEU to ensure that these benefits are not outweighed by some serious drawbacks of constitutional review in light of the Charter.

This article reviews the legal and political science literatures on the extensive interpretation of the European fundamental freedoms and on possible ways out. The common market rules were originally laid down in an international treaty, the Treaty of Rome. In functional terms, this treaty became a de facto constitution, implying that its content, including the fundamental freedoms, were constitutionalised. We review how this constitutionalisation constrains legislators at the Member State and European levels. In order to identify possible ways out, we also review several reform options: institutional reforms of the European judicial system; the de-constitutionalisation of the fundamental freedoms; counterbalancing these freedoms with further strengthened social rights; and contestation of over-constitutionalisation within the given primary law framework. We conclude that reform options are available that could gradually free the legislators from the over-constitutionalisation of the common market rules. Such options should become part of the ‘Conference on the Future of Europe’ process and debates about EU reforms in general, as more flexibility is warranted in a heterogeneous EU.

This article argues that constitutional pluralism is not a theory merely for times of equanimity, but crucially, in times of constitutional conflict. Given that it rests on the premise of regarding law as a dynamic, incrementally developing creature, constitutional conflict is no exceptional event, and represents an important element of the system's functioning. However, this does not mean that every point of conflict necessarily means progress for the pluralist system as a whole: it is possible to distinguish constructive from destructive conflict. In this respect, this piece will put forward a normative argument concerning the limits to which the auto-correct function of constitutional pluralism can stretch. In so doing, this piece will look at the recent jurisprudence of constitutional conflict at the EU and national level to demonstrate the limits of constructive conflict, as well as show how the example of Poland falls into the category of destructive conflict.

Article 6 Treaty on European Union sets out two sources of fundamental rights in the EU—the Charter and the general principles of EU law—without specifying a hierarchy between them. Even though the Charter became binding over a decade ago, the Court of Justice of the European Union (‘CJEU’) is yet to clarify unequivocally how these two sources interact. In this article I argue based upon the relevant legal framework that the Charter ought to replace the general principles it enshrines. This leaves a role for general principles in the incorporation of new and additional rights into the EU legal framework. Such an approach is necessary to ensure that the Charter achieves its aims in enhancing the visibility of the rights protected by EU law, while also providing the impetus for more coherent rights protection within the EU. What an extensive survey of CJEU case law in the field of non-discrimination shows, however, is that the CJEU has struggled to let its general principles case law go, potentially hampering the transformative potential of the Charter.

This contribution will tackle a central question for the architecture of fundamental rights protection in the EU: can we envision a Charter that fully applies to the Member States, even beyond the limits of its scope of application? To improve our understanding of the boundaries of the Charter and the potential for further expansion, I will examine the legal avenues through which the CJEU has extended the scope of application of EU fundamental rights in fields of state powers. While the latent pull of citizenship towards a more expansive application of the Charter has not been fully realized, the principle of effective judicial protection (Article 19(1) TEU) has recently shown potential for protection under EU law beyond the boundaries of the Charter. As will be argued, effective judicial protection may well become a doorway for full application of the Charter to the Member States. While such an outcome might currently seem politically unsound, I contend that a progressive case-by-case expansion of the applicability of the Charter to the Member States would be welcome from the standpoint of a robust notion of the rule of law in the EU.

In April 2019, the Court of Justice of the EU (‘CJEU’) handed down its Opinion (C-1/17) on the compatibility of the Investment Court System (‘ICS’), that is the Investor-State Dispute Settlement (‘ISDS’) mechanism under the EU-Canada Comprehensive and Economic Trade Agreement (‘CETA’), with EU law. This article puts Opinion 1/17 in its broader (policy and legal) context, focusing on the salient issue of compatibility with the principle of autonomy of the EU legal order. It argues that the Court's openness to this judicial competitor was an acknowledgment of the need to maintain the powers of the Union in international relations. However, Opinion 1/17 should not be perceived as an automatic green light for any future investment court (such as the Multilateral Investment Court) as the autonomy test it introduces is a rather difficult one to pass.

EU Internal Market law and international arbitration increasingly interact with each other but there are important areas of conflict between the two that represent an obstacle to market integration in a common area of justice. The article examines, from the perspective of EU public economic law, these areas of conflict to assess the extent to which the Internal Market needs harmonised rules on commercial arbitration to support dispute resolution and access to an efficient delivery of justice within its operation. The current state of affairs is unsatisfactory and it lacks legal certainty. If properly regulated, commercial arbitration can become an important instrument functional to EU market efficiency.