Questions can be raised about the central status that evolutionarily ancient core knowledge systems are given in Spelke's otherwise very compelling theory. So, the existence of domain-general learning capacities has to be admitted, too, and no clear reason is provided to doubt the existence of uniquely human cognitive adaptations. All of these factors should be acknowledged when explaining human thought.

Spelke posits that the concept of “social agent,” who performs object-directed actions to fulfill social goals, is the first noncore concept that infants acquire as they begin to learn their native language. We question this proposal on empirical grounds and theoretical grounds, and propose instead that the representation of object-mediated interactions may be supported by a dedicated prelinguistic mechanism.

There is no room for pragmatic expectations about communicative interactions in core cognition. Spelke takes the combinatorial power of the human language faculty to overcome the limits of core cognition. The question is: Why should the combinatorial power of the human language faculty support infants' pragmatic expectations not merely about speech, but also about nonverbal communicative interactions?

Innateness of core knowledge mechanisms (in the form of “cognitive priors”) can be revealed by proper comparisons of altricial and precocial species. Cognitive priors and sensitive periods in their expression may also provide clues for the development of plausible artificial intelligence systems.

Spelke's sweeping proposal requires greater precision in specifying the place of language in early cognition. We now know by 3 months of age, infants have already begun to forge a link between language and core cognition. This precocious link, which unfolds dynamically over development, may indeed offer an entry point for acquiring higher-order, abstract conceptual and representational capacities.

Twenty-five commentaries raise questions concerning the origins of knowledge, the interplay of iconic and propositional representations in mental life, the architecture of numerical and social cognition, the sources of uniquely human cognitive capacities, and the borders among core knowledge, perception, and thought. They also propose new methods, drawn from the vibrant, interdisciplinary cognitive sciences, for addressing these questions and deepening understanding of infant minds.

Psychologists and neuroscientists extensively rely on computational models for studying and analyzing the human mind. Traditionally, such computational models have been hand-designed by expert researchers. Two prominent examples are cognitive architectures and Bayesian models of cognition. Although the former requires the specification of a fixed set of computational structures and a definition of how these structures interact with each other, the latter necessitates the commitment to a particular prior and a likelihood function that – in combination with Bayes' rule – determine the model's behavior. In recent years, a new framework has established itself as a promising tool for building models of human cognition: the framework of meta-learning. In contrast to the previously mentioned model classes, meta-learned models acquire their inductive biases from experience, that is, by repeatedly interacting with an environment. However, a coherent research program around meta-learned models of cognition is still missing to date. The purpose of this article is to synthesize previous work in this field and establish such a research program. We accomplish this by pointing out that meta-learning can be used to construct Bayes-optimal learning algorithms, allowing us to draw strong connections to the rational analysis of cognition. We then discuss several advantages of the meta-learning framework over traditional methods and reexamine prior work in the context of these new insights.

We challenge Binz et al.'s claim of meta-learned model superiority over Bayesian inference for large world problems. While comparing Bayesian priors to model-training decisions, we question meta-learning feature exclusivity. We assert no special justification for rational Bayesian solutions to large world problems, advocating exploring diverse theoretical frameworks beyond rational analysis of cognition for research advancement.

The meta-learning framework proposed by Binz et al. would gain significantly from the inclusion of affective and homeostatic elements, currently neglected in their work. These components are crucial as cognition as we know it is profoundly influenced by affective states, which arise as intricate forms of homeostatic regulation in living bodies.

Quantum active Bayesian inference and quantum Markov blankets enable robust modeling and simulation of difficult-to-render natural agent-based classical inferential paradoxes interfaced with task-specific environments. Within a non-realist cognitive completeness regime, quantum Markov blankets ensure meta-learned irrational decision making is fitted to explainable manifolds at optimal free energy, where acceptable incompatible observations or temporal Bell-inequality violations represent important verifiable real-world outcomes.

Binz et al. propose a general framework for meta-learning and contrast it with built-by-hand Bayesian models. We comment on some architectural assumptions of the approach, its relation to the active inference framework, its potential applicability to living systems in general, and the advantages of the latter in addressing the explanation problem.

The implementation of meta-learning targeted by Binz et al. inherits benefits and drawbacks from its nature as a connectionist model. Drawing from historical debates around bottom-up and top-down approaches to modeling in cognitive science, we should continue to bridge levels of analysis by constraining meta-learning and meta-learned models with complementary evidence from across the cognitive and computational sciences.

The authors' aim is to build “more biologically plausible learning algorithms” that work in naturalistic environments. Given that, first, human learning and memory are inextricable, and, second, that much human learning is unconscious, can the authors' first research question of how people improve their learning abilities over time be answered without addressing these two issues? I argue that it cannot.

Abundant experimental evidence illustrates violations of Bayesian models across various cognitive processes. Quantum cognition capitalizes on the limitations of Bayesian models, providing a compelling alternative. We suggest that a generalized quantum approach in meta-learning is simultaneously more robust and flexible, as it retains all the advantages of the Bayesian framework while avoiding its limitations.

Meta-learning is even more broadly relevant to the study of inductive biases than Binz et al. suggest: Its implications go beyond the extensions to rational analysis that they discuss. One noteworthy example is that meta-learning can act as a bridge between the vector representations of neural networks and the symbolic hypothesis spaces used in many Bayesian models.

I propose that meta-learned models, and in particular the situation-aware deployment of “learning-to-infer” modules can be advantageously extended to domains commonly thought to lie outside the cognitive, such as motivations and preferences on one hand, and the effectuation of micro- and coping-type behaviors.

Binz et al. argue that meta-learned models are essential tools for understanding adult cognition. Here, we propose that these models are particularly useful for testing hypotheses about why learning processes change across development. By leveraging their ability to discover optimal algorithms and account for capacity limitations, researchers can use these models to test competing theories of developmental change in learning.

We summarize the recent progress made by probabilistic programming as a unifying formalism for the probabilistic, symbolic, and data-driven aspects of human cognition. We highlight differences with meta-learning in flexibility, statistical assumptions and inferences about cogniton. We suggest that the meta-learning approach could be further strengthened by considering Connectionist and Bayesian approaches, rather than exclusively one or the other.

Binz et al. propose meta-learning as a promising avenue for modelling human cognition. They provide an in-depth reflection on the advantages of meta-learning over other computational models of cognition, including a sound discussion on how their proposal can accommodate neuroscientific insights. We argue that active inference presents similar computational advantages while offering greater mechanistic explanatory power and biological plausibility.

Deep meta-learning is the driving force behind advances in contemporary AI research, and a promising theory of flexible cognition in natural intelligence. We agree with Binz et al. that many supposedly “model-based” behaviours may be better explained by meta-learning than by classical models. We argue that this invites us to revisit our neural theories of problem solving and goal-directed planning.