Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Home

The logic of moral outrage

  • Eric Luis Uhlmann (a1)

Abstract

McCullough et al.'s functionalist model of revenge is highly compatible with the person-centered approach to moral judgment, which emphasizes the adaptive manner in which social perceivers derive character information from moral acts. Evidence includes act–person dissociations in which an act is seen as less immoral than a comparison act, yet as a clearer indicator of poor moral character.

Copyright

References

Hide All
Becker, K. D., Steuwig, J., Herrera, V. M. & McCloskey, L. A. (2004) A study of firesetting and animal cruelty in children: Family influences and adolescent outcomes. Journal of the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry 43:905–12.
Gaertner, S. L. & Dovidio, J. F. (1986) The aversive form of racism. In: Prejudice, discrimination, and racism, ed. Dovidio, J. F. & Gaertner, S. L., pp. 6189. Academic Press.
Haidt, J. (2001) The emotional dog and its rational tail: A social intuitionist approach to moral judgment. Psychological Review 108:814–34.
Haidt, J., Koller, S. & Dias, M. (1993) Affect, culture, and morality, or is it wrong to eat your dog? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 65:613–28.
Hsee, C. K., Loewenstein, G. F., Blount, S. & Bazerman, M. H. (1999) Preference reversals between joint and separate evaluation of options: A review and theoretical analysis. Psychological Bulletin 125:576–90.
Nelson, J. D. (2005) Finding useful questions: On Bayesian diagnosticity, probability, impact, and information gain. Psychological Review 112:979–99.
Nelson, J. D., McKenzie, C. R. M., Cottrell, G. W. & Sejnowski, T. J. (2010) Experience matters: Information acquisition optimizes probability gain. Psychological Science 21:960–69.
Pizarro, D. A. & Tannenbaum, D. (2011) Bringing character back: How the motivation to evaluate character influences judgments of moral blame. In: The social psychology of morality: Exploring the causes of good and evil, ed. Shaver, P. & Mikulincer, M., APA Books.
Pizarro, D. A. & Uhlmann, E. L. (2005) Do normative standards advance our understanding of moral judgment? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28:558–59.
Reeder, G. D. & Brewer, M. B. (1979) A schematic model of dispositional attribution in interpersonal perception. Psychological Review 86:6179.
Tannenbaum, D., Uhlmann, E.L. & Diermeier, D. (2011) Moral signals, public outrage, and immaterial harms. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 47:1249–54.
Uhlmann, E. L. & Zhu, L. (under review) Acts, persons, and intuitions: Person-centered cues and gut reactions to harmless transgressions.
Uhlmann, E. L., Zhu, L. & Diermeier, D. (under review a) When actions speak volumes: Person-centered cues and moral outrage over racial bigotry.
Uhlmann, E. L., Zhu, L. & Tannenbaum, D. (under review b) When it takes a bad person to do the right thing.

The logic of moral outrage

  • Eric Luis Uhlmann (a1)

Metrics

Altmetric attention score

Full text views

Total number of HTML views: 0
Total number of PDF views: 0 *
Loading metrics...

Abstract views

Total abstract views: 0 *
Loading metrics...

* Views captured on Cambridge Core between <date>. This data will be updated every 24 hours.

Usage data cannot currently be displayed