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An implausible model and evolutionary explanation of the revenge motive

  • Herbert Gintis (a1)


McCullough et al.'s target article is a psychological version of the reputation models pioneered by biologist Robert Trivers (1971) and economist Robert Frank (1988). The authors, like Trivers and Frank, offer an implausible explanation of the fact that revenge is common even when there are no possible reputational effects. I sketch a more plausible model based on recent research.



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An implausible model and evolutionary explanation of the revenge motive

  • Herbert Gintis (a1)


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