Hostname: page-component-8448b6f56d-mp689 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-04-24T10:54:02.878Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Demand Commitment and Legislative Bargaining: A Response

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  08 November 2007

MASSIMO MORELLI
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Extract

In this reply, I will focus on the implications of Montero and Vidal-Puga's finding, acknowledging that their result is correct. Thus, what follows should not be interpreted as a defense of the Proposition 2 of Morelli 1999, but as a clarification of the impact of this correction for the demand bargaining research agenda as a whole.

Type
FORUM
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 101 , Issue 4 , November 2007 , pp. 851
Copyright
© 2007 by the American Political Science Association

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Diermeier Daniel, and Antonio Merlo. 2004. “An Empirical Investigation of Coalitional Bargaining Procedures.” Journal of Public Economics 88 (March): 783– 97.Google Scholar
Fréchette Guillaume, John Kagel, and Massimo Morelli. 2005. “Behavioral Identification in Coalitional Bargaining: an Experimental Analysis of Demand Bargaining and Alternating Offers.” Econometrica 73 (November): 1893– 939.Google Scholar
Morelli Massimo. 1999. “Demand Competition and Policy Compromise in Legislative Bargaining.” American Political Science Review 93 (December): 809– 20.Google Scholar
Morelli Massimo, and Maria Montero. 2003. “The Demand Bargaining Set: General Characterization and Application to Majority Games.” Games and Economic Behavior 42 (January): 146– 64.Google Scholar