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Avarice and Ambition in Congress: Representatives' Decisions to Run or Retire from the U.S. House

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 September 2013

Richard L. Hall  and
Robert P. Van Houweling
Richard L. Hall
Affiliation:
University of Michigan
Robert P. Van Houweling
Affiliation:
Office of Senator Thomas A. Daschle
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Abstract

Over two centuries ago, Adam Smith wrote of two passions that motivate those seeking public distinction: avarice and ambition. By investing these categories with appropriately concrete meaning, we develop a model of House members' career decisions. Like other individuals contemplating retirement options, politicians act with an eye to their financial interests, but not all financial interests are alike. The financial factor that matters most involves perennial considerations of post-retirement pension benefits, not fleeting opportunities to exploit ethically questionable sources of outside income. Second, we embed in the model a theory of intra-institutional ambition. Members impute value both to leadership positions they expect to retain and positions they expect to obtain. Majority members well-positioned to exert future legislative leverage are less likely to retire. Finally, several sources of electoral insecurity increase retirement probability. In the main, members may be reelection-seekers but will not pay any price to seek something they may not find.

Type
Research Notes
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 89 , Issue 1 , March 1995 , pp. 121 - 136
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1995

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