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Asymmetric Information and The Coherence of Legislation: A Correction

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 2014

David Austen-Smith  and
William H. Riker
David Austen-Smith
Affiliation:
University of Rochester
William H. Riker
Affiliation:
University of Rochester
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Abstract

In the September 1987 issue of this Review, we developed a game-theoretic model of committee or legislative decision making, showing the extent to which members may have incentives to share, or conceal, information. Because the formal analysis and statement of results for this model were in error, we offer this correction.

Type
Research Notes
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 84 , Issue 1 , March 1990 , pp. 243 - 245
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1990

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