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Voter Participation and Strategic Uncertainty

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 2014

Thomas R. Palfrey
Affiliation:
Carnegie-Mellon University
Howard Rosenthal
Affiliation:
Carnegie-Mellon University

Extract

The paradox of not voting is examined in a model where voters have uncertainty about the preferences and costs of other voters. In game-theoretic models of voter participation under complete information, equilibrium outcomes can have substantial turnout even when voting costs are relatively high. In contrast, when uncertainty about preferences and costs is present, only voters with negligible or negative net voting costs participate when the electorate is large.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1985

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