At long last, the people of Iraq are freed from the brutality of Saddam Hussein. The swift success of the coalition’s military campaign has been followed by predictable difficulties in organizing a hew government, restoring an economy, rebuilding civic society, and quelling violence from remnants of the old regime. But these challenges are kept in scale by recalling a dictator who murdered three hundred thousand fellow citizens. Saddam chose weapons of mass destruction as the central symbol of his domestic and international swagger—using the same internal security apparatus to parry United Nations inspectors and to extinguish domestic political dissent. Removing Iraq’s Ba’athist regime has ended a looming danger to regional neighbors, including Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. The crucial hopes for Middle East peace may also be enhanced by the change. And a new government in Baghdad lessens the chance that weapons matériel will be transferred to ill-intentioned nonstate actors.

Relations between the United States and most other countries, including major U.S. allies, have been severely strained during the past year by divergent opinions about the rules of international law governing the use of armed force. On the one side, the Bush administration has unveiled a new strategic doctrine asserting the right to use force preemptively against any country or terrorist group that could potentially threaten U.S. security. On the other side, most UN members have rejected the Bush doctrine as inconsistent with the traditional view that armed force can only be used when authorized by the Security Council or in self-defense against an armed attack. I will argue that neither the new Bush doctrine nor the strict interpretation of the “jurisprudes” represents good law or good policy. The new strategic environment, marked by suicidal terrorists and the spread of mass destruction weapons, requires a different approach.

President George W. Bush historically challenged the United Nations Security Council when he uttered some memorable words in the course of his September 12, 2002, speech to the General Assembly: “Will the UN serve the purpose of its founding, or will it be irrelevant?” In the aftermath of the Iraq war there are at least two answers to this question. The answer of the U.S. government would be to suggest that the United Nations turned out to be irrelevant due to its failure to endorse recourse to war against the Iraq of Saddam Hussein. The answer of those who opposed the war is that the UN Security Council served the purpose of its founding by its refusal to endorse recourse to a war that could not be persuasively reconciled with the UN Charter and international law. This difference of assessment is not just factual, whether Iraq was a threat and whether the inspection process was succeeding at a reasonable pace; it was also conceptual, even jurisprudential. The resolution of this latter debate is likely to shape the future role of the United Nations, as well as influence the attitude of the most powerful sovereign state as to the relationship between international law generally and the use of force as an instrument of foreign policy.

The international dimensions of terrorism had been identified prior to World War II. Nonetheless, no agreement could be reached on an acceptable definition, or appropriate action, and the 1937 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism, adopted by the League of Nations, was ratified by a single country. The issue resurfaced in the late 1950s when private individuals perpetrated an alarming number of incidents endangering civil aviation during transnational flights. These incidents led to the adoption of three distinct conventions on the subject, namely the 1963 Tokyo Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, the 1970 Hague Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, and the 1971 Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation.

The United States articulated a new concept of preventive self-defense last fall that is designed to preclude emerging threats from endangering the country. Rising like a phoenix from the ashes of the September 11 terrorist attacks, the preventive approach to national security is intended to respond to new threats posed by “shadowy networks of individuals [who] can bring great chaos and suffering to our shores for less than it costs to purchase a single tank.” The Bush administration wisely concluded that it could not rely solely upon a reactive security posture, due to the difficulty in deterring potential attacks by those determined to challenge the United States and the magnitude of harm that could occur from weapons of mass destruction falling into the wrong hands. Although the administration has characterized its new approach as “preemptive,” it is more accurate to describe it as “preventive” self-defense. Rather than trying to preempt specific, imminent tiireats, the goal is to prevent more generalized threats from materializing.

Thirty-three years ago I published an article in this Journal entitled Who Killed Article 2 (4)? or: Changing Norms Governing the Use of Force by States, which examined the phenomenon of increasingly frequent resort to unlawful force by Britain, France, India, North Korea, the Soviet Union, and the United States. The essay concluded with this sad observation:

The failure of the U.N. Charter's normative system is tantamount to the inability of any rule, such as that set out in Article 2(4), in itself to have much control over the behavior of states. National self-interest, particularly the national self-interest of the super- Powers, has usually won out over treaty obligations. This is particularly characteristic of this age of pragmatic power politics. It is as if international law, always something of a cultural myth, has been demythologized. It seems this is not an age when men act by principles simply because that is what gentlemen ought to do. But living by power alone ... is a nerve-wracking and costly business.

Following September 11, 2001, the Security Council took a number of important steps in the fight against terrorism. It condemned global terror and recognized the right to self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter in responding forcefully to those horrific attacks. Perhaps its most significant action in this area, however, was the adoption of Resolution 1373 which established the Counter-Terrorism Committee (the CTC). Addressing the significance and substance of this Security Council action, this essay reviews the work of the CTC to date, highlighting some of its accomplishments, and then touches upon some of the challenges the CTC will likely confront as it progresses with its mission. How it chooses to confront these challenges will surely have a considerable impact on its future work.