Two centuries down the road of history, the constitutional ordering of “that vast external realm” remains very much a fuzzy experiment. The national experience has yielded few certain answers to the great question how the foreign relations power is allocated.

Considerable ink has been spilt on the subject of 28 U.S.C. §1350, the Alien Tort Statute. My limited purposes here are to address Anne-Marie Burley’s appealing analysis of the statute presented in the last issue of the Journal and to draw attention to significant legislation that casts additional light on the framing of the statute. My comments relate to Oliver Ellsworth, the drafter of section 1350 and the most influential senator in the First Congress, which enacted the Alien Tort Statute.

The material in this section is arranged according to the system employed in the annual Digest of United States Practice in International Law, published by the Department of State.

In response to a request by Canadian tax authorities under the United States-Canada Double Taxation Convention (Convention), the U.S. Internal Revenue Service (IRS) issued summonses to obtain U.S. bank records concerning certain accounts of respondents, Canadian citizens whose Canadian tax liability was under investigation. Respondents sought to quash the summonses, arguing that because under 26 U.S.C. §7609(b) the IRS is prohibited by U.S. law from using its summons authority to obtain information about a U.S. taxpayer once a case is referred to the Justice Department for prosecution, and because the tax investigation of respondents was part of a Canadian criminal investigation, the IRS should be precluded from using its summons authority to honor the Canadian request under the Convention. Unsuccessful in the district court, respondents prevailed in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which held that under the “good faith” standard applicable to enforcement of domestic summonses, the IRS may issue a summons pursuant to a Convention request only if it first determines and makes an affirmative statement to the effect that the Canadian investigation has not reached a stage analogous to a Justice Department referral by the IRS. The U.S. Supreme Court (per Brennan, J.) reversed, and held: (1) that if the summons is issued in good faith, it is enforceable regardless of whether the Canadian request is directed toward criminal prosecution under Canadian law; and (2) neither United States law nor anything in the text or the ratification history of the Convention supports the imposition of additional requirements. Justice Kennedy (joined by O’Connor, J.), concurring in part and in the judgment, filed a brief opinion to state his view that it is unnecessary to decide whether Senate preratification materials are authoritative sources for treaty interpretation. Justice Scalia, concurring in the judgment, wrote separately to oppose the use of such materials in treaty construction.

Minorco, S.A., a Luxembourg mining company allegedly controlled by South African interests, commenced a tender offer for Consolidated Gold Fields, PLC (Gold Fields), a British mining company. Gold Fields, together with its partially owned American subsidiary, Newmont Mining Corp. (Newmont), filed suit in U.S. federal district court to enjoin the tender offer. The district court held that Newmont, the affected American subsidiary, had standing to raise an antitrust claim and issued a preliminary injunction restraining the tender offer. The district court dismissed a claim based on alleged violation of U.S. securities laws for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and held that Gold Fields, as the target company, did not itself have standing to raise an antitrust claim. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (per Newman, J.) reversed in part and affirmed in part, holding that: (1) Newmont had standing under the U.S. antitrust laws to object to the tender offer; (2) Gold Fields also had antitrust standing (by 2-1); and (3) the U.S. courts did have subject matter jurisdiction over Gold Fields’s U.S. securities law claims. Accordingly, the court of appeals upheld the injunction and returned the case to the lower court for further proceedings. On remand, the district court found that inasmuch as Gold Fields had not demonstrated a likelihood that its U.S. securities law claims would be successful on the merits, those claims did not merit an injunction. The court also ruled that Minorco had failed to demonstrate that its plan to hold separate and sell the assets of Gold Fields posing the possible antitrust problem would provide adequate protection, and so kept the injunction against the tender offer in place. As a result, even though a majority of the Gold Fields shareholders had tendered their shares to Minorco and both British and European Communities regulatory authorities had approved the transaction, Minorco was forced to abandon its tender offer.

Appellant, Thomas J. Ward, appealed a district court decision appointing commissioners to obtain evidence sought by the Crown Prosecution Service of the United Kingdom (Crown Service). The district court had appointed the commissioners pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1782 (1982), to depose in the United States certain third-party witnesses with knowledge relevant to a criminal investigation in the United Kingdom. On review, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (per Ginsburg, J.) affirmed the district court’s decision and held: that 28 U.S.C. §1782 authorized the appointment of the commissioners, even though there was no pending criminal proceeding in the United Kingdom when the depositions were requested and the procedure for the depositions might vary from that normally applicable in the United States. The court remanded the case, however, for a further determination to ensure that the depositions would comply with procedural rules applicable in the United Kingdom.

A Norwegian court issued two letters of request under the Hague Evidence Convention asking for the assistance of the English High Court in compelling testimony from two witnesses residing in England in connection with proceedings in Norway to collect taxes assessed against the estate of a wealthy Norwegian shipowner. After extensive litigation, Norway and the estate appealed to the House of Lords from a decision by the Court of Appeal that English courts lacked jurisdiction to accede to the requests because the Norwegian proceedings involved fiscal matters not within the meaning of “civil or commercial matters” as used in section 9(1) of the Evidence (Proceedings in Other Jurisdictions) Act of 1975 (ch. 34), which was enacted to implement the Hague Evidence Convention. The witnesses sought to uphold the Court of Appeal’s decision on lack of jurisdiction; they argued in the alternative that, even if there were jurisdiction, the letters of request should be denied execution because they constituted either an impermissible fishing expedition or “tax gathering” inconsistent with the decision in Government of India v. Taylor, or because execution would compel the witnesses to breach their duty of confidentiality as bankers. The House of Lords decided each of these issues in favor of Norway and the estate, and affirmed (i.e., “did not disturb”) the order obtained by Norway to compel testimony.

The International Law Commission of the United Nations held its 41st session from May 2 to July 21, 1989, under the Chairmanship of Professor Bernhard Graefrath. The most noteworthy achievement of the session was the completion of work on the status of the diplomatic courier and the diplomatic bag not accompanied by diplomatic courier. The Commission referred this draft to the General Assembly with the recommendation that the Assembly convoke a diplomatic conference for the purpose of concluding a convention on the basis of the articles. Also at the 41st session, the Commission adopted three articles of the Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind and discussed reports on state responsibility, international liability for injurious consequences arising out of acts not prohibited by international law, jurisdictional immunities of states and their property, and the law of the non-navigational uses of international watercourses. A report on relations between states and international organizations was presented to the Commission but was not discussed for lack of time. Finally, the Commission once again devoted a number of meetings to reviewing its procedures and methods of work.