The constitutional tug-of-war between Great Britain and Rhodesia has been tentatively settled, primarily on Rhodesian terms. When Rhodesia unilaterally declared its independence in November 1965, the British initially assumed that Ian Smith's regime would collapse within a few weeks from internal pressure. This has proved to be incorrect. The British imposed stiffer economic sanctions to raise the costs of secession and thus encourage white dissatisfaction with government policy. These penalties evoked very little electoral dissatisfaction and may have strengthened the hand of Prime Minister Smith. After six years of sanctions, it was Great Britain that made the concessions.

The ability of Rhodesia to survive economic sanctions and get Britain to accept constitutional terms virtually guaranteeing permanent white rule was due mainly to the overwhelming support of the Smith regime by white Rhodesians. The government's ability to get around many sanctions moderated some discontent, but this circumvention could not have been accomplished without the active cooperation of major segments of the population, particularly the business community, a group which traditionally had aligned itself with the opposition party. If there had been disaffection toward the government, then the British sanctions could have created serious public morale and support problems.