I appreciate this opportunity to document the long struggle of the Mozambican people for independence and to examine United States policies in response to their quest for self-determination. Within this broad framework, I would like to focus on the long-range goals of FRELIMO (Mozambique Liberation Front), the hostile position of the United States toward the liberation movement, and the achievements of the transitional government during the past year. In conclusion I will recommend some fundamental policy changes which are necessary if the United States is to adopt a progressive posture toward Southern Africa.

Mozambique’s rise to independence this June 25th constitutes another example in the world community of successful nationalist revolution against colonialism. Although it comes in the late nationalist period which witnessed its beginnings in central Europe during the nineteenth century, the Mozambican revolution’s international and Marxist image is comprehensible in the general historical context of nationalism.

Mozambique is a territory of approximately 300,000 square miles, bounded on the East entirely by the Indian Ocean, on the North by Tanzania and on the West and South by Malawi, Zambia, Rhodesia, Swaziland and the Republic of South Africa. Of the total population of ±7,000,000, there are perhaps 80,000-90,000 Portuguese left, 35,000 mulattoes, and 25,000 East Indians, Pakistanis and Chinese. Of the Black population, the largest ethnic groups are the Makua-Lomwe, perhaps 2,500,000 in the Center-North, the Shona, 1,600,000 strong in the Center, and the Thonga, about 1,300,000 in the South. The population is divided religiously between the Moslems North of the Zambezi River and the Christian or Pagan South. Mozambique, unlike Angola, is still overwhelmingly rural and tribal, and knowledge of the Portuguese language is not widespread outside the urban centers. Additionally, the Portuguese population of the territory, in contrast to Angola, has always been predominantly made up of either peasants or functionaries of the government or of Metropolitan Corporations. Thousands of these have left in the past year. In any case, the entrepreneurial spirit was largely lacking.

After a fifteen year colonial struggle, Angolan nationalists are on the verge of realizing or destroying an independent Angolan state. With the collapse and exit of the old colonial regime, three rival liberation movements have been left to compete for political ascendancy. It may be useful therefore to focus briefly on (1) the genesis and character of this political tripolarity, on (2) the tendency for it to encourage extensive external intervention and on (3) some thoughts concerning what, under the circumstances, might constitute an appropriate American response.

In addition to our discussions today of the current situation in Angola, I would like to direct my remarks to the question of what role, if any, the United States should play with regard to Angola, and concretely, how the Congress can assist in the formulation and execution of a responsible American policy toward Angola. We have all learned a number of important lessons from recent revelations about the conduct of American policy in Southeast Asia, about Government coverups such as Watergate, corporate bribery of foreign officials and political parties, and about the illegal and unacceptable activities of the CIA as described in the Rockefeller Commission report and elsewhere. Certainly we can apply some of these lessons to our present consideration of U.S. policy toward Angola; hopefully we will learn the vital facts and ask the necessary questions now, rather than, as has too often been the case, after the fact.

I would like to thank the Subcommittee for inviting me to testify before it on the subject of Angola.

In this presentation I shall make six major points. Briefly, and in summary, they are the following: one, the historical record in Angola, both remote and recent, suggests that there are deep roots to the current political fragmentation and conflict in that country and that, even under good conditions, political unity and stable government will be difficult to establish. Two, the Alvor Agreement, signed on January 15, 1975, between Portugal and the three major Angolan nationalist parties is, on paper, a masterful piece of diplomacy and compromise; its provisions should be studied and enforced.

I appreciate very much this opportunity to present our views on what the United States should do to encourage political progress in Rhodesia.

Since the establishment of the Washington Office on Africa in the fall of 1972, we have devoted much of our efforts to working with sympathetic members of Congress and citizens across the country to improve United States policy toward Rhodesia and specifically to repeal the Byrd Amendment, which three-and-a-half years ago created a statutory violation of this country’s treaty obligation to comply with the United Nations sanctions program. So we are pleased to participate in hearings on southern Africa and especially this one on Rhodesia.

The purpose of my statement is to place recent events in perspective and to speculate in broad terms about forthcoming developments as these may affect or be affected by U.S. policy. Other commentators are much better positioned than I to present detailed statistical evidence and to estimate near term developments based on the most recent facts.

Mr. Chairman, Members of the sub-committee, I am grateful for this opportunity to appear before you and to testify about Rhodesia.

Rhodesia is a strategically located colony with great potential. Whether called Rhodesia or Zimbabwe, it has a valuable resource base and could, under favorable circumstances, serve once again as the fulcrum of a prosperous and progressive Southern Africa.

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Subcommittee:

I want to congratulate you for holding this series of hearings on southern Africa at a time when change is occurring fast and furiously in that part of the world and when it is vital for our government to respond knowledgeably and sympathetically. I also want to thank you for the opportunity to speak to you about Namibia, which has been of special concern to me for many years now. I speak here in my personal capacity, of course, and my views do not necessarily reflect UN positions.

Mr. Chairman, I wish to express appreciation for the invitation to appear before the Committee. It is Congress that must take the lead to end what is essentially a “cover-up” of U.S. policy on southern Africa. The Congress must insist on

1. (1) a frank statement of the facts on the situation in South Africa,

2. (2) an open analysis of U.S. interests in that area,

3. (3) progress towards a therapeutic confrontation, discussion, debate, and analysis of what U.S. policy should be,

4. (4) change with a view towards developing an honest, sensible and rational U.S. policy—consistent with U.S. interests—towards South Africa.

My statement is not an attempt to convey new information. Indeed, anyone reading simply the record of the Congressional hearings will have all the essential and relevant facts. Why is it that we have been ever searching for but never coming to the truth? Why do we listen but never hear, look but never see, manipulate but never truly feel? Perhaps we express the right facts but the wrong values?

One of the major problems for anyone trying to understand United States-South Africa policy and relationships is the long established tradition of double talking. To find the truth it is necessary to penetrate behind the coded language and to recognize a series of myths which serve to cloak a far more unpleasant reality.

The perspective we are taking today on U.S. policy towards Southern Africa is, I believe, badly needed. It is both wrong and unrealistic to see southern Africa as detached from the rest of Africa. Africans in majority-ruled Africa know that. The British certainly know it. The Russians and the Chinese seem to know it. South Africa’s John Vorster has made clear how well he knows it.

I appreciate the invitation of the Committee to appear during the Subcommittee’s series of hearings on the situation in southern Africa. The situation and problems of that part of the world, indeed of Africa as a whole, deserve more attention than Americans, including members of the Congress, have given it heretofore. It will be clear from my statement that I believe it necessary to correct a number of aspects of policy which the United States has followed in southern Africa, particularly in recent years. An essential prerequisite for the correction of policy is knowledge and understanding of developments there.

My remarks will be relatively brief because I agree with a great deal of what my distinguished academic colleagues have already said. I do, however, take a different position with respect to American policy toward South Africa and have some ideas of my own concerning our overall Africa policy.

The decolonization process set in motion by the spectacular change of government in Lisbon in April 1974 produced a geopolitical earthquake across all of southern Africa. Its repercussions were deeply felt in the Republic of South Africa, where the government was forced to undertake a fundamental reassessment of South African relations with Mozambique, with Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), and with Namibia (South West Africa).