Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-848d4c4894-75dct Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-05-14T16:20:33.183Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

9 - Model Situations, Typical Cases, and Exemplary Narratives

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 November 2012

Mary S. Morgan
Affiliation:
London School of Economics and Political Science
Get access

Summary

Introduction

The model that forms the heart of this chapter is the Prisoner’s Dilemma game, in which we find two thin model men making a strategic choice within a small model world. The characters are the rational economic men whose history we charted in Chapter 4, while the small world is one of those characteristically small and constrained model worlds like the Edgeworth Box (of Chapter 3) or the supply and demand model (of Chapter 7). In this chapter, the Prisoner’s Dilemma game shows how the thin man inhabits the small world in a way that epitomises modelling in modern economics.

The Prisoner’s Dilemma game is not just a standard working object in economics, but represents an important general problem in a shorthand way for economists. It is one of a number of simple ‘games’ studied in the social sciences that represent not just situations of conflict in which choices must be made, but situations in which the players face a dilemma in choosing what actions to take. But, significantly, the Prisoner’s Dilemma game also presents a dilemma for social scientists, particularly economists, studying the game, for the outcome of the rightly reasoned or ‘rational’ action by the individuals taken separately leads to an outcome that seems to be wrong or ‘irrational’ when the individuals are taken together, that is, for society. This combination of qualities has turned the Prisoner’s Dilemma game into an exemplary model not only for such situations in the economic world but also with respect to fundamental beliefs that economists hold about the economy.

Type
Chapter
Information
The World in the Model
How Economists Work and Think
, pp. 344 - 377
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2012

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Axelrod, R. 1984 The Evolution of CooperationNew YorkBasic BooksGoogle Scholar
Baden-Fuller, CharlesMorgan, Mary S. 2010 “Business Models as Models”Long Range Planning 43 156CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Boumans, Marcel 1999
Caldwell, Bruce J. 1991 Clarifying Popper”Journal of Economic Literature 29 1Google Scholar
Campbell, R.Sowden, L. 1985 Paradoxes of Rationality and CooperationVancouverUniversity of British Columbia PressGoogle Scholar
Carter, M.Maddock, R. 1987 “Inflation: The Invisible Foot of Macroeconomics”Economic Record 63(181) 120CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Dray, William 1957 Laws and Explanation in HistoryOxfordOxford University PressGoogle Scholar
Dray, William 1963 The Philosophy of HistoryOxfordOxford University PressGoogle Scholar
Fisher, F. M. 1989 “Games Economists Play: A Noncooperative View”RAND Journal of Economics 20 113CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Flood, M. 1952
Van Fraassen, B. 1988 Pitt, J. C.Theories of ExplanationOxfordOxford University PressGoogle Scholar
Fudenberg, D.Tirole, J. 1991 Game TheoryCambridge, MAMIT PressGoogle Scholar
Gardiner, Patrick 1974 The Philosophy of HistoryOxfordOxford University PressGoogle Scholar
Giocoli, Nicola 2003 Modeling Rational Agents: From Interwar Economics to Early Modern Game TheoryCheltenhamEdward ElgarGoogle Scholar
Grüne-Yanoff, TillSweinzer, Paul 2008 “The Role of Stories in Applying Game Theory”Journal of Economic Methodology 15 131CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hands, D. Wade 1992 Marchi, Neil DePost-Popperian Methodology of Economics: Recovering PracticeDordrechtKluwerGoogle Scholar
Hands, D. Wade 2001 Reflection Without RulesCambridgeCambridge University PressCrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hargreaves Heap, S. P. 1994 “Institutions and (Short-Run) Macroeconomic Performance”Journal of Economic Surveys 8 35CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hargreaves Heap, S. P.Varoufakis, Y. 1995 Game Theory: A Critical IntroductionLondonRoutledgeCrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hartmann, Stephan 1999
Hayek, F. A. von 1937 “Economics and Knowledge”Economica 4 33Google Scholar
Hempel, Carl G. 1961 “Rational Action”Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 35 5CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hempel, Carl G. 1965 Aspects of Scientific ExplanationNew YorkFree PressGoogle Scholar
Koertge, Noretta 1975 “Popper’s Metaphysical Research Program for the Human Sciences”Inquiry 18 437CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Koertge, Noretta 1979 “The Methodological Status of Popper’s Rationality Principle”Theory and Decision 10 83CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kreps, David M. 1990 A Course in Microeconomic TheoryNew YorkHarvesterGoogle Scholar
Kreps, David M. 1990 Game Theory and Economic ModellingOxfordClarendon PressCrossRefGoogle Scholar
Latsis, Spiro J. 1972 “Situational Determinism in Economics”British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 23 207CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Le Guin, Ursula 1980 Mitchell, W. J. T.On NarrativeChicagoUniversity of Chicago PressGoogle Scholar
Leibenstein, H. 1982
Leonard, R. J. 1994 De Marchi, N.Morgan, M. S.Higgling: Transactors and Their Markets in the History of EconomicsDurham, NCDuke University PressGoogle Scholar
Leonard, R. J. 2010 From Red Vienna to Santa MonicaNew YorkCambridge University PressGoogle Scholar
Luce, R. D.Raiffa, H. 1957 Games and DecisionsNew YorkWileyGoogle Scholar
Mandeville, B. 1705 The Fable of the Bees, Or, Private Vices, Publick BenefitsKaye, F. B.OxfordClarendonGoogle Scholar
Menger, Carl 1883 Investigations into the Method of the Social Sciences with Special Reference to EconomicsNock, Francis J.Schneider, LouisNew YorkNew York University PressGoogle Scholar
Mirowski, P. 2002 Machine Dreams: Economics Becomes a Cyborg ScienceCambridgeCambridge University PressGoogle Scholar
Morgan, Mary S. 2002 “Models, Stories and the Economic World”Journal of Economic Methodology 8 361CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Morgan, Mary S. 2002 Magnani, L.Nersessian, N.J.Model-Based Reasoning: Science, Technology, ValuesNew YorkKluwer Academic/PlenumGoogle Scholar
Morgan, Mary S. 2002 “How models help economists to know” [Commentary on John Sutton’s ]Economics and Philosophy 18 5CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Morgan, Mary S. 2003 Porter, T.Ross, D.The Cambridge History of ScienceCambridgeCambridge University PressGoogle Scholar
Morgan, Mary S. 2007 Creager, AngelaLunbeck, ElizabethNorton Wise, M.Science Without Laws: Model Systems, Cases, and Exemplary NarrativesDurham, NCDuke University PressGoogle Scholar
Morgan, Mary S.Morrison, Margaret 1999 Models as Mediators: Perspectives on Natural and Social ScienceCambridgeCambridge University PressCrossRef
Neumann, John vonMorgenstern, Oskar 1944 The Theory of Games and Economic behaviorPrinceton, NJPrinceton University PressGoogle Scholar
Ober, J. 2007 Science Without Laws: Model Systems, Cases, and Exemplary NarrativesDurham, NCDuke University PressGoogle Scholar
http://dictionary.oed.com/
Peltzman, S. 1991 “The Handbook of Industrial Organization: A Review Article”Journal of Political Economy 99 201CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Popper, Karl R. 1945 Miller, D.Popper SelectionsPrinceton, NJPrinceton University PressGoogle Scholar
Popper, Karl R. 1963 1994 Notturno, M. A.The Myth of the Framework. In Defence of Science and Rationality”LondonRoutledgeGoogle Scholar
Popper, Karl R. 1967 Miller, D.Popper SelectionsPrinceton, NJPrinceton University PressGoogle Scholar
Poundstone, W. 1992 Prisoner’s DilemmaNew YorkDoubleday/AnchorGoogle Scholar
Raiffa, H. 1992
Rapoport, A. 1962
Rapoport, A. 1966 Two-Person Game TheoryAnn ArborThe University of Michigan PressGoogle Scholar
Rapoport, A.Chammah, A. M. 1965 Prisoner’s DilemmaAnn ArborThe University of Michigan PressCrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Rapoport, AnatolGuyer, Melvin 1966
Rasmussen, E. 1989 Games and InformationOxfordBlackwellGoogle Scholar
Roth, Alvin E. 1995 Kagel, John H.Roth, Alvin E.The Handbook of Experimental EconomicsPrinceton, NJPrinceton University PressGoogle Scholar
Selgin, G. 1996 “Salvaging Gresham’s Law: The Good, the Bad, and the Illegal”Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 28 637CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Shubik, M. 1953 “The Role of Game Theory in Economics”Kyklos 6 21CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Shubik, M. 1959 Strategy and Market StructureNew YorkWileyGoogle Scholar
Shubik, M. 1970 “Game Theory, Behavior, and the Paradox of the Prisoner’s Dilemma: Three Solutions”Conflict Resolution 14 181CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Shubik, M. 1975 The Uses and Methods of GamingAmsterdamElsevierGoogle Scholar
Siegel, S.Fouraker, 1960 Bargaining and Group Decision Making. Experiments in Bilateral MonopolyNew YorkMcGraw-HillGoogle Scholar
Smith, A. 1776 An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of NationsCampbell, R. H.Skinner, A. S.OxfordOxford University PressCrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sutton, J. 1990 “Explaining Everything, Explaining Nothing?”European Economic Review 34 505CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sutton, J. 2000 Marshall’s Tendencies. What Can Economists Know?Cambridge, MAMIT PressGoogle Scholar
Tullock, G. 1985 “Adam Smith and the Prisoners’ Dilemma”Quarterly Journal of Economics 100 1073CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ullman-Margalit, E. 1978 “Invisible-Hand Explanations”Synthese 39 263CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Weintraub, E. Roy 1992 Toward a History of Game TheoryDurham, NCDuke University PressGoogle Scholar
1944

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×