Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Figures and Tables
- Acknowledgments
- 1 The Puzzle of Single-Party Dominance
- PART 1 THE MACRO-PERSPECTIVE
- PART 2 THE MICRO-PERSPECTIVE
- PART 3 IMPLICATIONS
- 6 Constrained to the Core: Opposition Party Organizations, 1980s–1990s
- 7 Dominance Defeated: Voting Behavior in the 2000 Elections
- 8 Extending the Argument to Italy, Japan, Malaysia, and Taiwan
- 9 Conclusions and Implications
- References
- Index
8 - Extending the Argument to Italy, Japan, Malaysia, and Taiwan
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 27 July 2009
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Figures and Tables
- Acknowledgments
- 1 The Puzzle of Single-Party Dominance
- PART 1 THE MACRO-PERSPECTIVE
- PART 2 THE MICRO-PERSPECTIVE
- PART 3 IMPLICATIONS
- 6 Constrained to the Core: Opposition Party Organizations, 1980s–1990s
- 7 Dominance Defeated: Voting Behavior in the 2000 Elections
- 8 Extending the Argument to Italy, Japan, Malaysia, and Taiwan
- 9 Conclusions and Implications
- References
- Index
Summary
Mexico was just one of 16 dominant party systems, albeit the longest lasting to date. Other dominant parties have existed in Asia, Europe, and Africa. To this point, I have shown that the predictions derived from my resource theory of dominance hold up when tested with an abundance of quantitative and qualitative data about Mexico under PRI dominance during most of the 20th century. I have also shown that my explanation performs better than existing approaches that either overpredict or underpredict opposition party formation and success. But how generalizable is the theory? Can it account for single-party dominance in other countries with different cultural norms and political institutions? Does it make sense both for presidential systems like Mexico and for parliamentary ones? Do the dynamics of partisan competition that sustain the dominant party equilibrium result from particular electoral systems? Can the theory be extended not only to account for dominant party persistence in other authoritarian regimes but also to understand the dynamics of dominant party rule where the surrounding regime is democratic?
In this chapter, I show that my resource theory of dominance is surprisingly generalizable and that the unique features of dominance mute the effects of other variables thought to affect partisan dynamics. I do this by examining the dynamics of dominant party rule and opposition party building in Taiwan, Malaysia, Japan, and Italy. In extending the argument to these cases, I have two goals.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Why Dominant Parties LoseMexico's Democratization in Comparative Perspective, pp. 255 - 296Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2007