Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of figures
- List of tables
- List of contributors
- Preface
- 1 Who governs the globe?
- Part I Authority dynamics and new governors
- Part II Authority dynamics and governance outcomes
- 7 Packing heat: pro-gun groups and the governance of small arms
- 8 Governing the global agenda: “gatekeepers” and “issue adoption” in transnational advocacy networks
- 9 Outsourcing authority: how project contracts transform global governance networks
- 10 When “doing good” does not: the IMF and the Millennium Development Goals
- 11 The power of norms; the norms of power: who governs international electrical and electronic technology?
- 12 “Education for all” and the global governors
- 13 Conclusion: authority, legitimacy, and accountability in global politics
- References
- Index
- Cambridge Studies in International Relations
10 - When “doing good” does not: the IMF and the Millennium Development Goals
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 June 2012
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of figures
- List of tables
- List of contributors
- Preface
- 1 Who governs the globe?
- Part I Authority dynamics and new governors
- Part II Authority dynamics and governance outcomes
- 7 Packing heat: pro-gun groups and the governance of small arms
- 8 Governing the global agenda: “gatekeepers” and “issue adoption” in transnational advocacy networks
- 9 Outsourcing authority: how project contracts transform global governance networks
- 10 When “doing good” does not: the IMF and the Millennium Development Goals
- 11 The power of norms; the norms of power: who governs international electrical and electronic technology?
- 12 “Education for all” and the global governors
- 13 Conclusion: authority, legitimacy, and accountability in global politics
- References
- Index
- Cambridge Studies in International Relations
Summary
Global governors commonly interact in hopes of cooperating and coordinating in order to tackle global problems, but these attempts can also result in unintended or poor outcomes that risk undermining the entire process. This is especially true in cases in which global governors diffuse common goals, rules, or norms horizontally and/or vertically across a variety of international actors without ensuring that there are clear, workable mechanisms by which they may be translated into specific policies. International organizations (IOs) are increasingly struggling with the effects of these efforts at cooperation, as they find themselves juggling a growing number of issues and programs. In fact, all major IOs are being asked to address, in one form or another, the same common (and big) issues, such as poverty reduction, the environment, corruption, terrorism, human rights, and gender. The problem IOs face is the growing gap that exists between global governors' attempts to affect policy and IOs' ability to translate new issue areas into tangible outcomes, particularly where accountability mechanisms are weak and the “fit” between idea and institution is poor. As economist William Easterly (2005) has pointed out, “Collective responsibility for big goals doesn't hold any one agency accountable if the effort fails; they can always point to others as the ones who are to blame.” As the editors note in the opening chapter of this volume, this problem is especially acute when a governor is drawn to new competencies outside its delegated areas of comparative advantage.
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- Who Governs the Globe? , pp. 266 - 291Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2010
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