Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Introduction
- Chronology
- Further reading
- Translator's note on the text
- List of abbreviations
- Disputed Questions on the Virtues
- On the Virtues in General: thirteen articles
- On Charity: thirteen articles
- On Brotherly Correction: two articles
- On Hope: four articles
- On the Cardinal Virtues: four articles
- Terminology
- Glossary
- Table of parallel questions
- Index of scriptural citations
- Index of non-scriptural citations
- Index of names and subjects
- CAMBRIDGE TEXTS IN THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY
On the Cardinal Virtues: four articles
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 June 2012
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Introduction
- Chronology
- Further reading
- Translator's note on the text
- List of abbreviations
- Disputed Questions on the Virtues
- On the Virtues in General: thirteen articles
- On Charity: thirteen articles
- On Brotherly Correction: two articles
- On Hope: four articles
- On the Cardinal Virtues: four articles
- Terminology
- Glossary
- Table of parallel questions
- Index of scriptural citations
- Index of non-scriptural citations
- Index of names and subjects
- CAMBRIDGE TEXTS IN THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY
Summary
The first question is whether the cardinal virtues are practical wisdom, justice, courage, and temperateness.
The second is whether the virtues are connected in such a way that if you possess one of them you possess them all.
The third is whether all the virtues within a person are equal.
The fourth is whether when we are in our homeland the cardinal virtues will remain.
Article 1: Whether there are four cardinal virtues, i.e. practical wisdom, justice, courage, and temperateness
Objections
It seems not, because:
(1) If things are not distinguished from one another, they ought not to be counted up together, since distinctions are what make it possible to have numbers, as John Damascene tells us [OrthF 2.1]. But the virtues in question are not distinguished from one another, since Gregory says [MorJob 22.1.2], ‘Practical wisdom is not true unless it is just and temperate and courageous; temperateness is not complete unless it is courageous and just and has practical wisdom; courage is not whole unless it has practical wisdom and is temperate and just; justice is not true unless it has practical wisdom and is courageous and temperate.’ Therefore these ought not to be described as four distinct cardinal virtues.
(2) These virtues seem to be known as ‘cardinal’ because they are more fundamental than others: hence some people describe as fundamental what others call cardinal, as Gregory makes clear [MorJob 22.1.2]. But since an end is more fundamental than whatever contributes to that end, the theological virtues, which have as their object the ultimate end, seem to be more fundamental than the virtues in question here, which concern whatever contributes to that end. Therefore the virtues in question ought not to be called ‘cardinal’.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Thomas Aquinas: Disputed Questions on the Virtues , pp. 241 - 277Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2005