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References

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 October 2023

Yannis Stephanou
Yannis Stephanou
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National and Kapodistrian University of Athens
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A Theory of Truth , pp. 329 - 336
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2023

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  • References
  • Yannis Stephanou, National and Kapodistrian University of Athens
  • Book: A Theory of Truth
  • Online publication: 07 October 2023
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009437141.013
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  • References
  • Yannis Stephanou, National and Kapodistrian University of Athens
  • Book: A Theory of Truth
  • Online publication: 07 October 2023
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009437141.013
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  • References
  • Yannis Stephanou, National and Kapodistrian University of Athens
  • Book: A Theory of Truth
  • Online publication: 07 October 2023
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009437141.013
Available formats
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