Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of contributors
- Preface
- 1 Introduction
- Part I What is acquired – theory-theory versus simulation-theory
- Part II Modes of acquisition – theorising, learning, and modularity
- 9 The modularity of theory of mind
- 10 The relationship between SAM and ToMM: two hypotheses
- 11 Theories and modules: creation myths, developmental realities, and Neurath's boat
- 12 What is theoretical about the child's theory of mind?: a Vygotskian view of its development
- 13 Desires, beliefs, and language
- Part III Failures of acquisition – explaining autism
- Part IV Wider perspectives – evolution and theory of mind
- References
- Author index
- Subject index
12 - What is theoretical about the child's theory of mind?: a Vygotskian view of its development
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 03 May 2011
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of contributors
- Preface
- 1 Introduction
- Part I What is acquired – theory-theory versus simulation-theory
- Part II Modes of acquisition – theorising, learning, and modularity
- 9 The modularity of theory of mind
- 10 The relationship between SAM and ToMM: two hypotheses
- 11 Theories and modules: creation myths, developmental realities, and Neurath's boat
- 12 What is theoretical about the child's theory of mind?: a Vygotskian view of its development
- 13 Desires, beliefs, and language
- Part III Failures of acquisition – explaining autism
- Part IV Wider perspectives – evolution and theory of mind
- References
- Author index
- Subject index
Summary
Theory-of-mind development
The only games in town
Three different views, all well represented in this volume, have been prominent in the lively debate on the origins of children's theory of mind. They are the theory-theory, the simulation theory, and the modularity view, and they are, according to Gopnik (this volume) ‘the only games in town’. Proponents of all three views agree that during their pre-school years children develop a theory of mind which underlies their ability to understand social interaction by the attribution of mental states to themselves and to others. But this ‘theory of mind’ is not the same for the theory-theorist, the simulation theorist, and the modularity theorist. Indeed, they may not even mean the same thing by the term ‘theory’.
Samet (1993) distinguishes between taxonomic theories and postulational ones, relating the former to a weaker and the latter to a stronger sense of ‘theory’. Taxonomic theories are conceptual systems which help to organise our experience within a domain. The concepts mediate our understanding of the domain in question, and can be used to explain phenomena in that domain. However, the concepts are not of unobservables which are postulated to exist in order to provide explanation of the phenomena. Although mental states may not be directly observable, we do have some experiential knowledge of their existence.
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- Information
- Theories of Theories of Mind , pp. 184 - 199Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1996
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