Introduction

In a world of finite resources, states occasionally use or threaten force to coerce what they cannot obtain more expediently through bargain or barter. Historically, territory has been a particularly potent source of interstate friction (Vasquez 1993). Land, and the resources in and under territory, traditionally served as the basis for sovereign wealth and power. Big states were naturally stronger, and often attempted to co-opt their smaller neighbors (Fazal 2002; Alesina and Spolaore 2005; Lake and O'Mahony 2004). Warfare ensued as sovereigns sought to take or hold territory, or to acquire or retain resources and populations tied to the soil. A variety of arguments and anecdotes suggest ways in which the incentives to compete over territory have diminished among advanced industrialized economies. Two main forces characterize economic changes thought to be associated with a decline in the propensity toward territorial conflict: economic development and globalization. Economic development involves specialization of labor, technological innovation, the concentration of capital, and other measures that substantially increase productivity beyond levels in traditional societies. Globalization consists of the integration of markets and the decentralization of production networks.

Students of international politics have long been interested in the role of economic development in curbing, or augmenting, the impetus to take up arms. Still, how economic processes relate to interstate conflict is as yet poorly understood. Elsewhere, I point out that contrasting claims about economic development and conflict can be reconciled by recognizing that development differentially affects competition over different “goods.”