The Admiralty's first official operational planning was prompted by the realization that a future Anglo-German war was a likelihood due to the High Seas Fleet's growth and Germany's attempts to break the diplomatic alignment of the Entente in 1905–6. The Royal Navy's strategy focused on offensive inshore, blockade, and amphibious operations in the North Sea and, particularly, the Baltic as the only viable avenues by which naval power could exert direct pressure on Germany. The plans were also by-products of the Norwegian/Scandinavian status quo dilemma, reflecting Admiralty and Foreign Office concerns that regional neutrality agreements or compacts could effectively close the Belts and the Sound. This would hamper an offensive against Germany itself. Increased opposition to Fisher's policies in 1908–9, principally from the C-in-C Channel Fleet, Lord Charles Beresford, created an environment antithetical to the establishment of a proper naval staff. As Fisher's paranoia over Beresford increased, he entrenched the Admiralty's strategic processes firmly under his prerogative and away from his Service opponents.

The April 1908 Baltic and North Sea status quo agreements, the Casablanca crisis (September to November 1908), and Austria's annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in late 1908–early 1909 also motivated the need for supplemental war plans. The co-existence of the Fisher-Beresford row and new plans for a possible Anglo-German conflict has created the impression that the Fisher regime's operational studies were unrealistic showpieces or smokescreens produced solely to confound the First Sea Lord's opponents.