Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Figures
- List of Tables
- Acknowledgments
- Glossary
- Introduction
- 1 Origins of Soviet Counterinsurgency
- 2 The Borderland Societies in the Interwar Period: The First Soviet Occupation and the Emergence of Nationalist Resistance
- 3 The Borderlands under German Occupation (1941–1944): Social Context of the Soviet Reconquest
- 4 Nationalist Resistance after the Soviet Reconquest
- 5 Soviet Agrarian Policy as a Pacification Tool
- 6 Deportations, “Repatriations,” and Other Types of Forced Migration as Aspects of Security Policy
- 7 Amnesties
- 8 Red Rurales: The Destruction Battalions
- 9 Police Tactics: Actions of NKVD Security Units, Intelligence Gathering, Covert Operations, and Intimidation
- 10 The Church in Soviet Security Policy
- 11 Violations of Official Policy and Their Impact on Pacification
- 12 Conclusion: Nationalist Resistance and Soviet Counterinsurgency in the Global Context
- Appendix A Note on Used Terms and Geographic and Personal Names
- Appendix B Note on Primary Sources
- Bibliography
- Index
7 - Amnesties
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 May 2010
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Figures
- List of Tables
- Acknowledgments
- Glossary
- Introduction
- 1 Origins of Soviet Counterinsurgency
- 2 The Borderland Societies in the Interwar Period: The First Soviet Occupation and the Emergence of Nationalist Resistance
- 3 The Borderlands under German Occupation (1941–1944): Social Context of the Soviet Reconquest
- 4 Nationalist Resistance after the Soviet Reconquest
- 5 Soviet Agrarian Policy as a Pacification Tool
- 6 Deportations, “Repatriations,” and Other Types of Forced Migration as Aspects of Security Policy
- 7 Amnesties
- 8 Red Rurales: The Destruction Battalions
- 9 Police Tactics: Actions of NKVD Security Units, Intelligence Gathering, Covert Operations, and Intimidation
- 10 The Church in Soviet Security Policy
- 11 Violations of Official Policy and Their Impact on Pacification
- 12 Conclusion: Nationalist Resistance and Soviet Counterinsurgency in the Global Context
- Appendix A Note on Used Terms and Geographic and Personal Names
- Appendix B Note on Primary Sources
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
To win a hundred victories in a hundred battles is not the highest excellence; the highest excellence is to subdue the enemy's army without fighting at all.
– Sun TzuGuerrilla warfare is usually a more bitter form of conflict than conventional combat because rebels and security forces ignore the “laws of war,” the border between combatants and civilians is blurred, and families of the opponents are victimized with deliberate cruelty to intimidate other civilians. However, apart from the warring parties, most people in rebellious regions “display a combination of weak preferences and opportunism, both of which are subject to survival considerations. Their association with risk-taking minorities tends to be loose and subject to the fortunes of the war and its impact on one's welfare.” A pragmatic government forfeits its desire for revenge and offers pardons to all those who joined the rebels because of accident or opportunistic considerations – and even to those who used to be committed to the cause but have lost faith in the victory; otherwise, desperate guerrilla remnants without alternatives will continue fighting for years. The success of amnesty hinges on a delicate balance of punishment and clemency, and a tilt toward either limits the effectiveness of counterinsurgency, as many governments have learned from experience. After Mexico won independence in 1820, its leaders regarded amnesties as the easiest way to undermine the armed contenders for power and to incorporate rebels and bandits into society.
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- The Soviet Counterinsurgency in the Western Borderlands , pp. 195 - 208Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2010