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2 - The many facets of social choice theory

from Part I - Social Choice and Capabilities

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 March 2024

By
Wulf Gaertner
Edited by
Flavio Comim ,
P. B. Anand  and
Shailaja Fennell
Flavio Comim
Affiliation:
Universitat Ramon Llull
P. B. Anand
Affiliation:
University of Bradford
Shailaja Fennell
Affiliation:
University of Cambridge
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Summary

The theory of social choice is very rich in topics and issues that have been discussed since Kenneth Arrow’s seminal contribution in 1951. This keynote chapter is only able to deal with only a few of them. The start is Arrow’s impossibility theorem, two routes that escape from this negative result and the issue of whether there are some properties that should be satisfied by every aggregation rule in order to qualify as desirable. Next, the literature on individual liberty and rights is related to the notion of freedom in the sense of control over one’s functioning bundle. Then the procedural aspect of individual and collective choice, often mentioned but not worked out in detail, is discussed. Finally, a particular approach to measure and compare capability sets is proposed.

Keywords

social choiceArrow’s theoremvoting rulesrights exercisingfreedomfunctioningscapability setsmeasurement and comparabilityprocedural aspects
Type
Chapter
Information
Social Choice, Agency, Inclusiveness and Capabilities , pp. 17 - 41
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2024

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