Introduction

In Islamic traditions, as well as in Jewish and Christian traditions, Adam represents more than his own identity as a prophet or the first man: he is a paradigmatic human being. Adam's constitution is considered to be that of humankind as a whole. Therefore, when we as historians of religion study narratives of Adam in these traditions, we study more than just Adam; we are engaged in anthropology and our question becomes what is a human according to these religious traditions? When we discuss narratives on Adam's banishment from Paradise to this-worldly life, it is thus not only about the event as such; the narratives under scrutiny express deeper concerns within these religious traditions about the meaning and appreciation of this-worldly life for the whole of humankind. This is equally the case with Sufism. Paul Nwyia has noted that ‘intériorisation des figures prophétiques’ is emblemic for Sufi understandings of the Qurʾan:

The question of Adam's banishment from Paradise has raised some fundamental questions about the nature of evil in the religious thought of the monotheistic traditions. Von Grunebaum has argued that evil is only accidental in Islam, not structural, as opposed to Christianity where it is both structural and accidental. The banishment from Paradise is the effect of an act of human fallibility, nothing more, nothing less. He holds that the question of evil, and with it the fall of Adam, is thus not as constitutive for Islam as it is for Christianity, where the coming of Christ is necessary to resolve the primal disorder brought about by Adam's fall. In Islamic tradition, the character of Iblīs (Satan), the story of his refusal to bow down before Adam and his subsequent banishment could be more important than Adam's fall for understanding the place of evil within Islam.