Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Introduction
- Part I The science of language and mind
- 1 Language, function, communication: language and the use of language
- 2 On a formal theory of language and its accommodation to biology; the distinctive nature of human concepts
- 3 Representation and computation
- 4 More on human concepts
- 5 Reflections on the study of language
- 6 Parameters, canalization, innateness, Universal Grammar
- 7 Development, master/control genes, etc.
- 8 Perfection and design (interview 20 January 2009)
- 9 Universal Grammar and simplicity
- 10 On the intellectual ailments of some scientists
- 11 The place of language in the mind
- 12 Chomsky's intellectual contributions
- 13 Simplicity and its role in Chomsky's work
- 14 Chomsky and Nelson Goodman
- Part II Human nature and its study
- Appendices
- Commentaries
- Glossary
- Bibliography
- Index
4 - More on human concepts
from Part I - The science of language and mind
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 June 2012
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Introduction
- Part I The science of language and mind
- 1 Language, function, communication: language and the use of language
- 2 On a formal theory of language and its accommodation to biology; the distinctive nature of human concepts
- 3 Representation and computation
- 4 More on human concepts
- 5 Reflections on the study of language
- 6 Parameters, canalization, innateness, Universal Grammar
- 7 Development, master/control genes, etc.
- 8 Perfection and design (interview 20 January 2009)
- 9 Universal Grammar and simplicity
- 10 On the intellectual ailments of some scientists
- 11 The place of language in the mind
- 12 Chomsky's intellectual contributions
- 13 Simplicity and its role in Chomsky's work
- 14 Chomsky and Nelson Goodman
- Part II Human nature and its study
- Appendices
- Commentaries
- Glossary
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
JM: We had spoken earlier about the distinctiveness of human concepts, and I'd like to get a bit clearer about what that amounts to. I take it that, at least in part, it has to do with the fact that human beings, when they use their concepts – unlike many animals – do not in fact use them in circumstances in which there is some sort of direct application of the concept to immediate circumstances or situations.
NC: Well, as far as anyone knows – maybe we don't know enough about other animals – what has been described in the animal literature is that every action (local, or whatever) is connected by what Descartes would have called a machine to either an internal state or an external event that is triggering it. You can have just an internal state – so the animal emits a particular cry [or other form of behavior] ‘saying’ something like “It's me” or “I'm here,” or a threat: something like “Keep away from me,” or maybe a mating cry. [You find this] all the way down to insects. Or else there is a reaction to some sort of external event; you get a chicken that's looking up and sees something that we interpret as “There's a bird of prey” – even though no one knows what the chicken is doing. It appears that everything is like that, to the extent – as mentioned before – that Randy Gallistel (1990) in his review introduction to a volume on animal communication suggests that for every animal down to insects, whatever internal representation there is, it is one-to-one associated with an organism-independent external event, or internal event. That's plainly not true of human language. So if [what he claims] is in any way near to being true of animals, there is a very sharp divide there.
JM: That's a sharp divide with regard to what might be called the “use” or application of relevant types of concepts, but I take it that it's got to be more than that . . .
NC: Well, it's their natures. Whatever the nature of HOUSE, or LONDON, ARISTOTLE, or WATER is – whatever their internal representation is – it's just not connected to mind-independent external events, or to internal states. It's basically a version of Descartes's point, which seems accurate enough.
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- The Science of LanguageInterviews with James McGilvray, pp. 33 - 35Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2012