A saleswoman is continually badgered by her superior. He tells her that she has a “nice ass” and that he would like to see her naked. He asks her out frequently, despite her continual rejections. He touches her when they talk. At first, he would touch her shoulder or her waist, but today, he runs his hand down her thigh. When she pushes him away, he says: “Loosen up. Are you some kind of prude?”

Is this sexual harassment? Why or why not? Various answers are typically offered to this question. One might claim that it is sexual harassment because it is degrading and makes the woman feel threatened. Alternatively, one could note the negative impact the behavior has on this employee's work and point out that she is targeted because she is a woman, which is discriminatory. On the other hand, one might respond that such conduct is not sexual harassment but only normal flirtation. One might even argue that the woman could deflect such behavior if she chose to, and if she does not, she probably welcomes it. One could conclude that the behavior does not constitute sexual harassment since the woman's supervisor has not dismissed, demoted, or otherwise penalized her in any “tangible” way. While one could focus on the supervisor's intent, one could alternatively prioritize the woman's perceptions.

Each of these responses reveals different conceptualizations of sexual harassment as a social harm and legal wrong. Using the concept of national cultural repertoires of evaluation, developed in this volume, I will explain why certain types of justifications are more common in the United States than in France and vice versa.