Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgments
- Restoring Responsibility
- Introduction: The Need for Institutional Responsibility
- PART I DEMANDS OF INSTITUTIONAL POLITICS
- PART II VARIETIES OF INSTITUTIONAL FAILURE
- 6 Democratic Secrecy
- 7 Mediated Corruption
- 8 Election Time
- 9 Hypocrisy and Democracy
- 10 Private Life and Public Office
- Part III EXTENSIONS OF INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
- Credits
- Index
9 - Hypocrisy and Democracy
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 29 January 2010
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgments
- Restoring Responsibility
- Introduction: The Need for Institutional Responsibility
- PART I DEMANDS OF INSTITUTIONAL POLITICS
- PART II VARIETIES OF INSTITUTIONAL FAILURE
- 6 Democratic Secrecy
- 7 Mediated Corruption
- 8 Election Time
- 9 Hypocrisy and Democracy
- 10 Private Life and Public Office
- Part III EXTENSIONS OF INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
- Credits
- Index
Summary
No criticism of politicians in liberal democracies is more common than the charge of hypocrisy. If true, the charge would seem to constitute a serious wrong. Hypocrisy, after all, is a species of deception, and no vice is more dangerous to democracy than deceit. As both politicians and philosophers have long emphasized, veracity is a precondition of democracy. To hold their leaders accountable for any decision or policy, citizens must have truthful information about what leaders and their opponents have done and intend to do.
No theorist insisted more consistently or eloquently on the need for accountability in moral and political life than did Judith Shklar. From her criticism of theorists of historical inevitability for their political evasions to her castigation of public officials for their indifference to passive injustice, she expressed nothing but contempt for people who exercise power without responsibility. Nor did Shklar, in her own writing or speaking, personally or professionally, hesitate to speak openly and candidly. “Facing up to” whatever problem was at issue (as in “Facing up to Intellectual Pluralism”) was her consistent counsel.
It is therefore surprising to find her, in Ordinary Vices, singing the praises of hypocrisy. In the most penetrating theoretical discussion of the subject since He gel's critique of the “age of hypocrisy,” Shklar vigorously defends hypocrites against their critics. She argues that “hypocrisy is one of the few vices that bolsters liberal democracy” (248). Her “liberalism of fear” not only accommodates hypocrisy but welcomes it.
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- Information
- Restoring ResponsibilityEthics in Government, Business, and Healthcare, pp. 209 - 226Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2004