The central question I address in this book is the following: What is the proper role of religious convictions in political decision making and advocacy? The most contentious issue associated with that question is whether it's morally appropriate for a citizen to support a coercive law L even if he enjoys only a religious rationale for L. My central thesis addresses that issue directly: as the reader will recall, I claim that a citizen has no obligation to withhold support from L even if he possesses only a religious rationale for L. This thesis is inconsistent with a defining commitment of justificatory liberalism, according to which each citizen morally ought to adhere to the doctrine of restraint – he ought to withhold support from any coercive law for which he can't discern a public justification. And since a religious rationale doesn't suffice for a public justification, the justificatory liberal is committed to denying that a citizen may support L if he enjoys only a religious rationale for L. Thus is the justificatory liberal committed to denying my central thesis. In order to vindicate my thesis, I've attempted to determine whether justificatory liberals have articulated compelling reason for the doctrine of restraint.

Although I have, for obvious reasons, focused my discussion on justificatory liberalism, recall that my stated intention is to address two audiences: the justificatory liberal, to be sure, but also his alter-ego: the religious sectarian who intends to conduct his political decision making and advocacy entirely within the ambit of his theological commitments.