Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- The G-24
- List of Contributors
- Foreword
- 1 Introduction
- 2 The Bretton Woods Institutions: Governance without Legitimacy?
- 3 Reforming the International Monetary Fund: Towards Enhanced Accountability and Legitimacy
- 4 Improving IMF Governance and Increasing the Influence of Developing Countries in IMF Decision-Making
- 5 Issues on IMF Governance and Representation: An Evaluation of Alternative Options
- 6 Making the IMF and the World Bank More Accountable
- 7 Purchasing Power Parities and Comparisons of GDP in IMF Quota Calculations
- 8 Measuring Vulnerability: Capital Flows Volatility in the Quota Formula
- 9 Enhancing the Voice of Developing Countries in The World Bank: Selective Double Majority Voting and a Pilot Phase Approach
- 10 Voting Power Implications of a Double Majority Voting Procedure in the IMF's Executive Board
- 11 Power versus Weight in IMF Governance: The Possible Beneficial Implications of a United European Bloc Vote
- 12 Changing IMF Quotas: The Role of the United States Congress
3 - Reforming the International Monetary Fund: Towards Enhanced Accountability and Legitimacy
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 March 2012
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- The G-24
- List of Contributors
- Foreword
- 1 Introduction
- 2 The Bretton Woods Institutions: Governance without Legitimacy?
- 3 Reforming the International Monetary Fund: Towards Enhanced Accountability and Legitimacy
- 4 Improving IMF Governance and Increasing the Influence of Developing Countries in IMF Decision-Making
- 5 Issues on IMF Governance and Representation: An Evaluation of Alternative Options
- 6 Making the IMF and the World Bank More Accountable
- 7 Purchasing Power Parities and Comparisons of GDP in IMF Quota Calculations
- 8 Measuring Vulnerability: Capital Flows Volatility in the Quota Formula
- 9 Enhancing the Voice of Developing Countries in The World Bank: Selective Double Majority Voting and a Pilot Phase Approach
- 10 Voting Power Implications of a Double Majority Voting Procedure in the IMF's Executive Board
- 11 Power versus Weight in IMF Governance: The Possible Beneficial Implications of a United European Bloc Vote
- 12 Changing IMF Quotas: The Role of the United States Congress
Summary
Abstract:
The following article outlines reforms for the IMF so as to enhance financial crisis prevention and management through better surveillance and transparency. With the present quota regime, creditor countries command excessive voting power, resulting in skewed crisis analysis and resource distribution. Consequently, exploring the democratic deficit within the governance structure of the Fund reveals much needed changes in the quota regime and voting system of significant import. Expressly, the democratic deficit results from three factors, namely, (1) the decline of basic votes in the Fund's quota regime has reduced the voice of smaller countries in the governance of the Fund; (2) biases in the calculation of economic strength have caused the IMF to neglect the strength of emerging market economies; and (3) the needless complexity and opacity involved in the calculation of quotas. As the governance structure of the Fund is a product of the political and economic agreements embodied in the quota regime, addressing the quota bias, the variable measurement and specification problems will provide the route towards a Fund that is in tune with the growing contiguous democratic consensus. Quota adjustments alone prove insufficient towards this democratic end and therefore we will explore reassessing the Fund size, given the pressing need for a larger Fund as the present size is too small when compared to the global GDP; readjusting access to the resources of the Fund in accordance with the gross financing need of the concerned country; re-examining the voting system and the veto market; restructuring the Executive Board so that every member of the Board is an elected member and; the Fund as an Economic Security Council (ESC), promoting stability in the global economy.
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- Reforming the Governance of the IMF and the World Bank , pp. 45 - 74Publisher: Anthem PressPrint publication year: 2005
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