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  • Print publication year: 2014
  • Online publication date: September 2014

Part I - Intuition in Western Philosophy

Bibliography

Barnes, J. 1974. Aristotle, Posterior Analytics. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Burnyeat, M. 1981. “Aristotle on Understanding Knowledge.” In E. Berti (Ed.), Aristotle on Science, The Posterior Analytics. Padua, Italy: Antenore.
Burnyeat, M.. 2011. “Episteme.” In B. Morison and K. Ierodiakonou (Eds.), Episteme, etc. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Choi, S. and Fara, M. 2012. “Dispositions.” In the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dispositions/
Frede, M. 1996. “Aristotle’s Rationalism.” In M. Frede and G. Striker (Eds.), Rationality in Greek Thought. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Irwin, T. 1981. “Aristotle’s Methods of Ethics.” In D. O’Meara (Ed.), Studies in Aristotle. Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press.
Irwin, T.. 1988. Aristotle’s First Principles. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Kripke, S. 1980. Naming and Necessity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Owen, G. E. L. 1986. Logic, Science and Dialectic. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Plantinga, A. 1993. Warrant and Proper Function. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Pust, J. 2012. “Intuition.” In the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/intuition/
Ross, W. D. 1949. Aristotle’s Prior and Posterior Analytics. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Russell, B. 2013. “A Priori Justification and Knowledge.” In the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/apriori/
Sorabji, R. 2010. “The Ancient Commentators on Concept Formation.” In F. DeHass et al. (Eds.), Interpreting Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics in Late Antiquity and Beyond. Leiden, NL: Brill.
Striker, G. 2009. Aristotle, Prior Analytics Book I. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

References

William of Ockham
Editions
Guillelmi de Ockham Opera Philosophica [hereafter : OPh], ed. by G. Gál et al., 7 vols., St. Bonaventure, NY: The Franciscan Institute, 1974–1988.
Guillelmi de Ockham Opera Theologica [hereafter: OTh], ed. by G. Gál et al., 10 vols., St. Bonaventure, NY: The Franciscan Institute, 1967–1986.

The following works are cited in the paper:

(1967). Ordinatio. Scriptum in Librum Primum Sententiarum. Prologus et Distinctio Prima [Ord.], ed. by G. Gál & S. Brown [= OTh I].
(1970). Ordinatio. Scriptum in Librum Primum Sententiarum. Distinctiones II–III, ed. by S. Brown [= OTh II].
(1974). Summa Logicae, ed. by Ph. Boehner, G. Gál & S. Brown [= OPh I].
(1980). Quodlibeta Septem [Quodl.], ed. by J. C. Wey [= OTh IX].
(1984). Quaestiones in Libros Physicorum Aristotelis, ed. by S. Brown [in OPh VI, pp. 395–813].
(1985). Expositio in Libros Physicorum Aristotelis, ed. by V. Richter et al. [= OPh IV–V].
English translations
(1974). Ockham’s Theory of Terms. Part I of the Summa Logicae, trans. by M. Loux. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.
(1980). Ockham’s Theory of Propositions. Part II of the Summa Logicae, trans. by A. J. Freddoso & H. Schuurman. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.
(1991). Quodlibetal Questions [Quodl.], trans. by A. J. Freddoso & F. E. Kelley. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Other cited works
Adams, M. M. (1987). William Ockham. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.
Bérubé, C. (1964). La connaissance de l’individuel au Moyen Âge. Montreal: Presses de l’Université de Montréal and Paris: PUF.
Bonjour, L. (1992). Externalism/Internalism. In J. Dancy & E. Sosa (Eds.), A Companion to Epistemology (pp. 132–136). Oxford: Blackwell.
Brandom, R. (1994). Making It Explicit. Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press.
Brandom, R.. (1997). Study guide. In W. Sellars, 1997 (pp. 119–181).
Brower-Toland, S. (2007). Intuition, externalism, and direct reference in Ockham. History of Philosophy Quarterly, 24, 317–335.
Campbell, K. (1995). Trope. In J. Kim & E. Sosa (Eds.), A Companion to Metaphysics (p. 500). Oxford: Blackwell.
Fodor, J. A. (1975). The Language of Thought. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Fodor, J. A.. (1987). Psychosemantics. The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Fodor, J. A.. (1998). Concepts. Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Fodor, J. A.. (2008). LOT 2. The Language of Thought Revisited. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Goldman, A. I. (1986). Epistemology and Cognition. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Goldman, A. I.. (1992). Reliabilism. In J. Dancy & E. Sosa (Eds.), A Companion to Epistemology (pp. 433–436). Oxford: Blackwell.
Hochberg, H. (2009). Particulars. In R. Le Poidevin et al. (Eds.), The Routledge Companion to Metaphysics (pp. 286–295). London: Routledge.
Lagerlund, H. (2006). What is singular thought ? Ockham and Buridan on singular terms in the language of thought. In V. Hirvonen, T. J. Holopainen & M. Tuominen (Eds.), Mind and Modality. Studies in the History of Philosophy in Honour of Simo Knuuttila (pp. 217–237). Leiden: Brill.
Lagerlund, H.. (2012). Material substance. In J. Marenbon (Ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Medieval Philosophy (pp. 468–485). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
McDowell, J. (1994). Mind and World. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Panaccio, C. (1992). From mental word to mental language. Philosophical Topics, 20, 125–147.
Panaccio, C.. (1998). William of Ockham. In E. Craig (Ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy (vol. 9, pp. 732–748). London: Routledge.
Panaccio, C.. (1999a). Le discours intérieur. De Platon à Guillaume d’Ockham. Paris: Seuil.
Panaccio, C.. (1999b). Semantics and mental language. In P. V. Spade (Ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Ockham (pp. 53–75). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Panaccio, C.. (2004). Ockham on Concepts. Aldershot: Ashgate.
Panaccio, C.. (2008). L’ontologie d’Ockham et la théorie des tropes. In Ch. Erismann & A. Schniewind (Eds.), Compléments de substance. Études sur les propriétés accidentelles (pp. 167–181). Paris: Vrin.
Panaccio, C.. (2009). Le savoir selon Guillaume d’Ockham. In R. Nadeau (Ed.), Philosophies de la connaissance (pp. 91–109). Québec: Presses de l’Université Laval and Paris: Vrin.
Panaccio, C.. (2010). Intuition and causality: Ockham’s externalism revisited. Quaestio 10 (Later Medieval Perspectives on Intentionality), 241–253.
Panaccio, C.. (2012). Intellections and volitions in Ockham’s nominalism. In M. Pickavé & L. Shapiro (Eds.), Emotions and Cognitive Life in Medieval and Early Modern Philosophy (pp. 75–93). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Panaccio, C.. (2014). Ockham’s externalism. In G. Klima (Ed.), Intentionality, Cognition and Mental Representation in Medieval Philosophy. New York: Fordham University Press.
Panaccio, C. & D. Piché (2009). Ockham’s reliabilism and the intuition of non-existents. In H. Lagerlund (Ed.), Rethinking the History of Skepticism. The Missing Medieval Background (pp. 97–118). Leiden: Brill.
Pasnau, R. (2010). Form and matter. In R. Pasnau (Ed.), The Cambridge History of Medieval Philosophy (vol. 2, pp. 635–646). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Perini-Santos, E. (2006). La théorie ockhamienne de la connaissance évidente. Paris: Vrin.
Roberts, F. (2009). What do I see when I see this lion ? Intuitive cognition and concept formation, according to William of Ockham. Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie Médiévales, 76, 335–364.
Rorty, R. (1979). Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. Princeton: University of Princeton Press.
Rorty, R.. (1997). Introduction. In W. Sellars, 1997 (pp. 1–12).
Schantz, R. (2004). Introduction. In R. Schantz (Ed.), The Externalist Challenge (pp. 1–33). Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
Sellars, W. (1997). Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind [1st ed. 1956]. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Spade, P. V. (1999) (Ed.) The Cambridge Companion of Ockham. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

William of Ockham

Editions
Guillelmi de Ockham Opera Philosophica [hereafter : OPh], ed. by G. Gál et al., 7 vols., St. Bonaventure, NY: The Franciscan Institute, 1974–1988.
Guillelmi de Ockham Opera Theologica [hereafter: OTh], ed. by G. Gál et al., 10 vols., St. Bonaventure, NY: The Franciscan Institute, 1967–1986.

The following works are cited in the paper:

(1967). Ordinatio. Scriptum in Librum Primum Sententiarum. Prologus et Distinctio Prima [Ord.], ed. by G. Gál & S. Brown [= OTh I].
(1970). Ordinatio. Scriptum in Librum Primum Sententiarum. Distinctiones II–III, ed. by S. Brown [= OTh II].
(1974). Summa Logicae, ed. by Ph. Boehner, G. Gál & S. Brown [= OPh I].
(1980). Quodlibeta Septem [Quodl.], ed. by J. C. Wey [= OTh IX].
(1984). Quaestiones in Libros Physicorum Aristotelis, ed. by S. Brown [in OPh VI, pp. 395–813].
(1985). Expositio in Libros Physicorum Aristotelis, ed. by V. Richter et al. [= OPh IV–V].
English translations
(1974). Ockham’s Theory of Terms. Part I of the Summa Logicae, trans. by M. Loux. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.
(1980). Ockham’s Theory of Propositions. Part II of the Summa Logicae, trans. by A. J. Freddoso & H. Schuurman. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.
(1991). Quodlibetal Questions [Quodl.], trans. by A. J. Freddoso & F. E. Kelley. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Editions

Guillelmi de Ockham Opera Philosophica [hereafter : OPh], ed. by G. Gál et al., 7 vols., St. Bonaventure, NY: The Franciscan Institute, 1974–1988.
Guillelmi de Ockham Opera Theologica [hereafter: OTh], ed. by G. Gál et al., 10 vols., St. Bonaventure, NY: The Franciscan Institute, 1967–1986.

The following works are cited in the paper:

(1967). Ordinatio. Scriptum in Librum Primum Sententiarum. Prologus et Distinctio Prima [Ord.], ed. by G. Gál & S. Brown [= OTh I].
(1970). Ordinatio. Scriptum in Librum Primum Sententiarum. Distinctiones II–III, ed. by S. Brown [= OTh II].
(1974). Summa Logicae, ed. by Ph. Boehner, G. Gál & S. Brown [= OPh I].
(1980). Quodlibeta Septem [Quodl.], ed. by J. C. Wey [= OTh IX].
(1984). Quaestiones in Libros Physicorum Aristotelis, ed. by S. Brown [in OPh VI, pp. 395–813].
(1985). Expositio in Libros Physicorum Aristotelis, ed. by V. Richter et al. [= OPh IV–V].

English translations

(1974). Ockham’s Theory of Terms. Part I of the Summa Logicae, trans. by M. Loux. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.
(1980). Ockham’s Theory of Propositions. Part II of the Summa Logicae, trans. by A. J. Freddoso & H. Schuurman. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.
(1991). Quodlibetal Questions [Quodl.], trans. by A. J. Freddoso & F. E. Kelley. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Other cited works

Adams, M. M. (1987). William Ockham. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.
Bérubé, C. (1964). La connaissance de l’individuel au Moyen Âge. Montreal: Presses de l’Université de Montréal and Paris: PUF.
Bonjour, L. (1992). Externalism/Internalism. In J. Dancy & E. Sosa (Eds.), A Companion to Epistemology (pp. 132–136). Oxford: Blackwell.
Brandom, R. (1994). Making It Explicit. Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press.
Brandom, R.. (1997). Study guide. In W. Sellars, 1997 (pp. 119–181).
Brower-Toland, S. (2007). Intuition, externalism, and direct reference in Ockham. History of Philosophy Quarterly, 24, 317–335.
Campbell, K. (1995). Trope. In J. Kim & E. Sosa (Eds.), A Companion to Metaphysics (p. 500). Oxford: Blackwell.
Fodor, J. A. (1975). The Language of Thought. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Fodor, J. A.. (1987). Psychosemantics. The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Fodor, J. A.. (1998). Concepts. Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Fodor, J. A.. (2008). LOT 2. The Language of Thought Revisited. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Goldman, A. I. (1986). Epistemology and Cognition. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Goldman, A. I.. (1992). Reliabilism. In J. Dancy & E. Sosa (Eds.), A Companion to Epistemology (pp. 433–436). Oxford: Blackwell.
Hochberg, H. (2009). Particulars. In R. Le Poidevin et al. (Eds.), The Routledge Companion to Metaphysics (pp. 286–295). London: Routledge.
Lagerlund, H. (2006). What is singular thought ? Ockham and Buridan on singular terms in the language of thought. In V. Hirvonen, T. J. Holopainen & M. Tuominen (Eds.), Mind and Modality. Studies in the History of Philosophy in Honour of Simo Knuuttila (pp. 217–237). Leiden: Brill.
Lagerlund, H.. (2012). Material substance. In J. Marenbon (Ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Medieval Philosophy (pp. 468–485). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
McDowell, J. (1994). Mind and World. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Panaccio, C. (1992). From mental word to mental language. Philosophical Topics, 20, 125–147.
Panaccio, C.. (1998). William of Ockham. In E. Craig (Ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy (vol. 9, pp. 732–748). London: Routledge.
Panaccio, C.. (1999a). Le discours intérieur. De Platon à Guillaume d’Ockham. Paris: Seuil.
Panaccio, C.. (1999b). Semantics and mental language. In P. V. Spade (Ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Ockham (pp. 53–75). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Panaccio, C.. (2004). Ockham on Concepts. Aldershot: Ashgate.
Panaccio, C.. (2008). L’ontologie d’Ockham et la théorie des tropes. In Ch. Erismann & A. Schniewind (Eds.), Compléments de substance. Études sur les propriétés accidentelles (pp. 167–181). Paris: Vrin.
Panaccio, C.. (2009). Le savoir selon Guillaume d’Ockham. In R. Nadeau (Ed.), Philosophies de la connaissance (pp. 91–109). Québec: Presses de l’Université Laval and Paris: Vrin.
Panaccio, C.. (2010). Intuition and causality: Ockham’s externalism revisited. Quaestio 10 (Later Medieval Perspectives on Intentionality), 241–253.
Panaccio, C.. (2012). Intellections and volitions in Ockham’s nominalism. In M. Pickavé & L. Shapiro (Eds.), Emotions and Cognitive Life in Medieval and Early Modern Philosophy (pp. 75–93). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Panaccio, C.. (2014). Ockham’s externalism. In G. Klima (Ed.), Intentionality, Cognition and Mental Representation in Medieval Philosophy. New York: Fordham University Press.
Panaccio, C. & D. Piché (2009). Ockham’s reliabilism and the intuition of non-existents. In H. Lagerlund (Ed.), Rethinking the History of Skepticism. The Missing Medieval Background (pp. 97–118). Leiden: Brill.
Pasnau, R. (2010). Form and matter. In R. Pasnau (Ed.), The Cambridge History of Medieval Philosophy (vol. 2, pp. 635–646). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Perini-Santos, E. (2006). La théorie ockhamienne de la connaissance évidente. Paris: Vrin.
Roberts, F. (2009). What do I see when I see this lion ? Intuitive cognition and concept formation, according to William of Ockham. Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie Médiévales, 76, 335–364.
Rorty, R. (1979). Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. Princeton: University of Princeton Press.
Rorty, R.. (1997). Introduction. In W. Sellars, 1997 (pp. 1–12).
Schantz, R. (2004). Introduction. In R. Schantz (Ed.), The Externalist Challenge (pp. 1–33). Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
Sellars, W. (1997). Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind [1st ed. 1956]. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Spade, P. V. (1999) (Ed.) The Cambridge Companion of Ockham. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

References

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