Book contents
- The Power of Global Performance Indicators
- The Power of Global Performance Indicators
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Contributors
- Preface
- 1 Introduction
- Part I Ratings, Rankings, and Regulatory Behavior
- 2 The Power of Ranking
- 3 Blacklists, Market Enforcement, and the Global Regime to Combat Terrorist Financing
- 4 The Power of Indicators in Global Development Policy
- Part II The Normative Influence of Ratings and Rankings
- Part III Beyond and Within State
- Part IV Skeptical Voices
- Index
- Chapter 3: Appendices
- Chapter 4: Appendices
- Chapter 5: Appendix
- Chapter 6: Appendix
- Chapter 7: Appendix
- Chapter 8: Appendix
- Chapter 10: Appendix
- Chapter 11: Appendix
- Chapter 12: Appendix
- References
3 - Blacklists, Market Enforcement, and the Global Regime to Combat Terrorist Financing
from Part I - Ratings, Rankings, and Regulatory Behavior
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 28 February 2020
- The Power of Global Performance Indicators
- The Power of Global Performance Indicators
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Contributors
- Preface
- 1 Introduction
- Part I Ratings, Rankings, and Regulatory Behavior
- 2 The Power of Ranking
- 3 Blacklists, Market Enforcement, and the Global Regime to Combat Terrorist Financing
- 4 The Power of Indicators in Global Development Policy
- Part II The Normative Influence of Ratings and Rankings
- Part III Beyond and Within State
- Part IV Skeptical Voices
- Index
- Chapter 3: Appendices
- Chapter 4: Appendices
- Chapter 5: Appendix
- Chapter 6: Appendix
- Chapter 7: Appendix
- Chapter 8: Appendix
- Chapter 10: Appendix
- Chapter 11: Appendix
- Chapter 12: Appendix
- References
Summary
This paper highlights how international organizations can use Global Performance Indicators (GPIs) to drive policy change through transnational market pressure. When international organizations are credible assessors of state policy, and when monitored countries compete for market resources, GPIs transmit information about country risk and stabilize market expectations. Under these conditions, banks and investors may restrict access to capital in non-compliant states and incentivize increased compliance. I demonstrate this market-enforcement mechanism through an analysis of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), an intergovernmental body that issues non-binding recommendations to combat money laundering and the financing of terrorism. The FATF’s public listing of non-compliant jurisdictions has prompted international banks to move resources away from listed states and raised the costs of continued non-compliance, significantly increasing the number of states with laws criminalizing terrorist financing. This finding suggests a powerful pathway through which institutions influence domestic policy and highlights the power of GPIs in an age where information is a global currency.
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- Information
- The Power of Global Performance Indicators , pp. 61 - 97Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2020
References
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