Introduction

Throughout his scholarly career, Robert Hudec has made many important contributions to our understanding of international trade law. Yet none has been so important as his explication of the essential differences between “law” and “legal institutions” in the international trade system and their domestic counterparts. “International trade law” is a distinct institutional form adapted to the particular political context in which it has developed and is applied. Thus, in this volume we are enjoined to explore the political economy of international trade law: how national and international politics are intertwined with economic considerations in this unique set of institutions. We take that line of analysis one step further here by considering the relative effectiveness of alternative institutional arrangements in dealing with the politics of emerging issues on the international trade agenda.

A major premise of this paper is that one can learn much about the World Trade Organization (WTO) as a legal and political institution by considering the deeply political decision-making processes that determine which issues it will address and in what form it will address them. In other words, we focus here on the “legislative” side of the international trade system, which has received much less attention than the “judicial” side. We do so in terms of an expansive conception of international legalization – spanning the range from “soft” to “hard” law – which allows us to treat both political and legal factors.