Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Principles
- Preface
- 1 Biography
- 2 Function and Argument
- 3 Sense and Reference
- 4 Frege's Begriffsschrift Theory of Identity
- 5 Concept and Object
- 6 Names and Descriptions
- 7 Existence
- 8 Thought, Truth Value, and Assertion
- 9 Indirect Reference
- 10 Through the Quotation Marks
- Appendix A Begriffsschrift in Modern Notation: (1) to (51)
- Appendix B Begriffsschrift in Modern Notation: (52) to (68)
- Notes
- Bibliography
- Index
3 - Sense and Reference
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 28 July 2009
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Principles
- Preface
- 1 Biography
- 2 Function and Argument
- 3 Sense and Reference
- 4 Frege's Begriffsschrift Theory of Identity
- 5 Concept and Object
- 6 Names and Descriptions
- 7 Existence
- 8 Thought, Truth Value, and Assertion
- 9 Indirect Reference
- 10 Through the Quotation Marks
- Appendix A Begriffsschrift in Modern Notation: (1) to (51)
- Appendix B Begriffsschrift in Modern Notation: (52) to (68)
- Notes
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
Introduction
Few texts are as well known to modern philosophers as Frege's (1892c: 151–2) opening paragraph:
Equality gives rise to challenging questions which are not altogether easy to answer. Is it a relation? A relation between objects, or between names or signs of objects? In my Begriffsschrift, I assumed the latter. The reasons which seem to favour this are the following: a = a and a = b are obviously statements of differing cognitive value.…Now if we were to regard equality as a relation between that which the names ‘a’ and ‘b’ designate [bedeuten], it would seem that a = b could not differ from a = a (i.e. provided a = b is true). A relation would thereby be expressed of a thing to itself but to no other thing. What is intended to be said by a = b seems to be that the signs or names ‘a’ and ‘b’ designate [bedeuten] the same thing, so that those signs themselves would be under discussion; a relation between them would be asserted. But this relation would hold between the names or signs only in so far as they named or designated something. It would be mediated by the connexion of each of the two signs with the same designated thing. But this is arbitrary. Nobody can be forbidden to use any arbitrarily producible event or object as a sign for something.
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- The Philosophy of Gottlob Frege , pp. 27 - 40Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2005
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