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The Philosophy of Animal Minds
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  • Cited by 13
  • Edited by Robert W. Lurz, Brooklyn College, City University of New York
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Book description

This volume is a collection of fourteen essays by leading philosophers on issues concerning the nature, existence, and our knowledge of animal minds. The nature of animal minds has been a topic of interest to philosophers since the origins of philosophy, and recent years have seen significant philosophical engagement with the subject. However, there is no volume that represents the current state of play in this important and growing field. The purpose of this volume is to highlight the state of the debate. The issues which are covered include whether and to what degree animals think in a language or in iconic structures, possess concepts, are conscious, self-aware, metacognize, attribute states of mind to others, and have emotions, as well as issues pertaining to our knowledge of and the scientific standards for attributing mental states to animals.

Reviews

'… a highly stimulating collection of papers which considerably advances the philosophy of animal minds. It will be of interest both within the borders of philosophy of mind and in the rapidly expanding scientific disciplines involved with animal thought and feeling.'

Source: Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews

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Contents

  • 1 - What do animals think?
    pp 15-34
  • View abstract

    Summary

    The chapter explores how we should think about specifying exactly what it is that a particular animal thinks on a particular occasion. It identifies a tension in our thinking about animal minds and reviews some ways of trying to resolve it. The fundamental problem we face is that most people are committed to the following pair of propositions: many animals think; exactly what animals think on particular occasions cannot reliably be characterized. The chapter discusses four families of responses to the problem: eliminativism, wet eliminativism, brute content view, and interpretivism. If we are tempted by interpretivism, then perhaps we should rethink, not just the problem with which we began, but the very way in which we have come to portray the mind in philosophical discourse. The idea of content is a metaphor that infuses the way in which philosophers think about mind and language.
  • 2 - Attributing mental representations to animals
    pp 35-51
  • View abstract

    Summary

    We quite naturally attribute mental representations in order to explain actions. The chapter argues that some animal behavior is properly so explained, and thus that some animals truly have beliefs and desires. There are two strands of evidence which separately support this conclusion. First, behavior that is appropriately explained in terms of mental states such as beliefs and desires is behavior directed at a goal relative to which the agent is able to learn; and since human behavior meets this criterion, the chapter discusses on evolutionary grounds, that some animal behavior meets this criterion as well. Second, it shows that a number of different scientific observations of animal behavior strongly support the hypothesis that animals engage in goal-directed behavior, behavior that is organized around a goal with respect to which they are able to learn and, hence, behavior that is justifiably explained in terms of their having beliefs and desires.
  • 3 - Chrysippus' dog as a case study in non-linguistic cognition
    pp 52-71
  • View abstract

    Summary

    To illustrate the explanatory potential of cognitive maps, this chapter deploys them against a venerable philosophical argument for languageless thought and reasoning. The explanation shows that we can accommodate Chrysippus' dog without assimilating animal minds to human minds. The chapter illustrates the explanatory resources of an intermediate position that countenances non-linguistic cognition while sharply distinguishing it from linguistic cognition. It focuses on two crucial features of human propositional attitudes: they have logical form, and they participate in deductive reasoning sensitive to that form. Discussions of Chrysippus' dog typically choose among four strategies: (1) Treat the dog as executing a deductive inference; (2) Attribute logical reasoning to the dog, but construe the attribution instrumentally; (3) Do not attribute logical reasoning to the dog; and (4) Grant that the dog records no additional relevant observations beyond those mentioned by Chrysippus. The chapter presents a Bayesian-cum-cartographic model of Chrysippus' dog.
  • 4 - Systematicity and intentional realism in honeybee navigation
    pp 72-88
  • View abstract

    Summary

    Fodor's discussion focused largely on human linguistic competence. This confounded the discussion with issues about the systematicity of natural language, which provides a special medium for peculiarly human thought. This chapter proposes control for this confound by considering the recent literature on honeybee navigation. After a brief discussion of some background issues, it summarizes some of the substantial research on honeybees' remarkable abilities to navigate and to convey information about various resources to other bees by means of their "waggle dance". The chapter argues that an examination of those abilities reveals that the processes underlying them are systematic, that this systematicity is best explained by presuming that honeybees implement some sort of classical language of thought, and that this explanation needs to be understood realistically. It concludes that bees really do have the intentional states that researchers routinely ascribe to them.
  • 5 - Invertebrate concepts confront the generality constraint (and win)
    pp 89-107
  • View abstract

    Summary

    This chapter defends the claim that invertebrates possess concepts against the so-called "generality constraint", first proposed by Evans. The use of the term "concept" in philosophy is systematically ambiguous. But sometimes concepts are intended to be mental representations, concrete components of the physical tokenings of the thoughts of which they form part. The chapter concerns almost exclusively with concepts in the latter sense. The question is whether invertebrates possess the sorts of mental representations that are the components of genuine thoughts. Someone might seize upon the distinction drawn between system-1 and system-2 thinking to propose that genuine thinking and genuine concepts should be reserved to system 2, with the sorts of system-1 thoughts and concepts that we share with the rest of the animal kingdom being described as mere proto-thoughts and proto-concepts. From the standpoint of cognitive science distinctively human thinking consists of mere faux-thoughts.
  • 6 - A language of baboon thought?
    pp 108-127
  • View abstract

    Summary

    In Baboon Metaphysics, Dorothy Cheney and Robert Seyfarth offer an analysis of baboon cognition that promises to exemplify the very best interaction of philosophical theory and empirical research. They argue that baboons have a language of thought: a language-like representational medium, which supports the sophisticated cognitive abilities required to negotiate their complex social environment. The author condenses six syntactic properties that Cheney and Seyfarth identify three broad categories: Representational/propositional/independent of sensory modality; Discrete-valued/rule-governed/open-ended; and Hierarchically structured. Beyond baboon cognition and the origins of language to draw two purely methodological morals. The first is that speculating about the form of thought is a dangerous business. It can seem almost irresistible to assume that thought has a form. Second theorists have neglected alternative representational possibilities because they have too unreflectively subscribed to a dichotomy between imagistic and linguistic formats.
  • 7 - Animal communication and neo-expressivism
    pp 128-144
  • View abstract

    Summary

    One of the earliest issues in cognitive ethology concerns about the meaning of animal signals. This chapter takes a new look at this debate in the light of recent developments in the philosophy of language under the heading of "neo-expressivism" (Bar-On). It provides three approaches to the study of animal communication: an approach that emphasizes its affective function, an approach that emphasizes its referential function, and an approach that combines both. The chapter presents four "conceptualist" principles characterized by Gunther: compositionality; cognitive significance; reference determinacy; and force independence. It discusses the application of these four principles of conceptuality to animal communication. If the issue for understanding non-human animal communication were that of truth-evaluability alone, perhaps either a conceptualist or non-conceptualist account would be appropriate, even non-conceptual content (NCC) can be true or false. The chapter concludes by proposing some future directions that continuation of the discussion might take.
  • 8 - Mindreading in the animal kingdom
    pp 145-164
  • View abstract

    Summary

    This chapter discusses some important framework questions about how exactly the mindreading hypothesis is to be stated. It distinguishes three importantly different versions of the mindreading hypothesis. The first (minimal mindreading) occurs when creature's behavior covaries with the psychological states of other participants in social exchanges. The second (substantive mindreading) involves attributions of mental states. The substantive mindreading is further divided into propositional attitude mindreading and perceptual mindreading. The chapter presents reasons for thinking that the role of propositional attitude psychology in human social life is very much overstated and shows that this very much weakens the analogical case for identifying propositional attitude mindreading in non-linguistic creatures. It provides a revised version of an argument that the author proposed. If this argument is sound, it shows that perceptual mindreading is the only form of substantive mindreading that can exist in the animal kingdom.
  • 9 - The representational basis of brute metacognition: a proposal
    pp 165-183
  • View abstract

    Summary

    This chapter clarifies the nature and semantic properties of metacognition in non-humans. As is the case for every philosophical inquiry concerning animal minds, studying animal metacognition should provide new perspectives on the structure of mental content and on mental activity in general. This exploration proceeds in four steps. First, the experimental evidence for animal metacognition is presented and the difficulties of a metarepresentational view on metacognition summarized. Second, the possibility of alternative, non-propositional semantic structures is discussed. Third, a specific representational format that might be sufficient for animal metacognition to develop is examined. Finally, some objections are addressed, and further developments of the proposal are considered. The question of whether human metacognition uses a separate feature-placing format, or is absorbed within the propositional mode of thinking, is still open, and current research may soon come up with interesting new constraints.
  • 10 - Animals, consciousness, and I-thoughts
    pp 184-200
  • View abstract

    Summary

    This chapter discusses and elaborates upon the evidence for higher-order thoughts (or I-thoughts) in animals. It also shows that the higher-order thought (HOT) theory is indeed consistent with animal consciousness. The chapter argues that recent experimental evidence on animal memory and metacognition strongly suggests that many animals have the self-concepts and mental-state concepts necessary to form I-thoughts. It answers to the claim that having I-thoughts requires having thoughts (and thus concepts) directed at others' mental states. The stakes are high because if the HOT theory is true, any evidence indicating the absence of I-thoughts would also cast doubt on animal consciousness itself. The very concept of "consciousness" is notoriously ambiguous, but perhaps the most commonly used contemporary notion of a "conscious" mental state is captured by Thomas Nagel's famous "what it is like" sense.
  • 11 - Self-awareness in animals
    pp 201-217
  • View abstract

    Summary

    This chapter claims that the cumulative force of various empirical data and conceptual considerations makes it more reasonable to accept than to deny that many animals are self-aware. It considers studies focusing on animals' preferences. In the philosophy of mind, desires and beliefs are classified as propositional attitudes, mental states that take propositions or sentences as their objects. Desires to do certain things and intentional actions that involve doing them suggest at least some rudimentary awareness of oneself as persisting through time. Strengthening the case for intentional action, and therefore for bodily self-awareness, is evidence of more sophisticated behaviors in animals involving planning, complex problem-solving, and/or tool use. Like intentional action involving a plan, fear requires some awareness that one will continue into the future. Since Gordon Gallup's pioneering experiments, self-recognition with mirrors has often been cited as evidence of self-awareness in animals.
  • 12 - The sophistication of non-human emotion
    pp 218-236
  • View abstract

    Summary

    This chapter argues that the conception of emotion as concern-based construals allows us to see degrees of sophistication in animals' emotions that would seem improbable if we thought of emotions as requiring the ability to have thoughts. It discusses that a crucial key to appreciate both the continuity and discontinuity between human emotions and the emotions of many non-human animals is the distinction between concepts and thoughts. The chapter presents an exhaustive list of dimensions of sophistication: emotions are situational; emotions can occur in the absence of the object; emotions can occur in response to a complex narrative; emotions can be felt; emotions can be dissented from; emotional dispositions are plastic; emotions can be reflexive in being (a) about their subject (b) about an emotion of their subject; and emotions can be about other people's mental states.
  • 13 - Parsimony and models of animal minds
    pp 237-257
  • View abstract

    Summary

    The chapter discusses the principle of conservatism and traces how the general principle is related to the specific one. This tracing suggests that the principle of conservatism needs to be refined. Connecting the principle in cognitive science to more general questions about scientific inference also allows us to revisit the question of realism versus instrumentalism. The framework deployed in model selection theory is very general; it is not specific to the subject matter of science. The chapter outlines some non-Bayesian ideas that have been developed in model selection theory. The principle of conservatism, like C. Lloyd Morgan's canon, describes a preference concerning kinds of parameters. It says that a model that postulates only lower-level intentionality is preferable to one that postulates higher-level intentionality if both fit the data equally well. The model selection approach to parsimony helps explain why unification is a theoretical virtue.
  • 14 - The primate mindreading controversy: a case study in simplicity and methodology in animal psychology
    pp 258-277
  • View abstract

    Summary

    Much of the recent debate has centred on an ongoing controversy over whether primates are capable of reasoning about basic aspects of the visual perspective and perceptual awareness of others. One issue that has played a prominent role in this controversy concerns the relative "simplicity" or "parsimony" of mindreading and non-mindreading explanations of behavior. This chapter discusses the role that such appeal to simplicity have played in this controversy as a case study for thinking about the proper place of simplicity considerations in inferring cognitive processes in non-human animals, and in science more generally. After providing some background to the controversy and describing the appeals to simplicity that have been made, it poses some problems for such appeals. The chapter outlines a general philosophical account of simplicity. It sheds light on the nature of evidence for primate mindreading, and on how future work might resolve this controversy.
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