Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgments
- The Persistence of Subjectivity
- 1 Introduction: “Bourgeois Philosophy” and the Problem of the Subject
- PART I SETTING
- PART II THEORISTS
- 3 Necessary Conditions for the Possibility of What Isn't: Heidegger on Failed Meaning
- 4 Gadamer's Hegel: Subjectivity and Reflection
- 5 Negative Ethics: Adorno on the Falseness of Bourgeois Life
- 6 The Unavailability of the Ordinary: Strauss on the Philosophical Fate of Modernity
- 7 Hannah Arendt and the Bourgeois Origins of Totalitarian Evil
- 8 On Not Being a Neo-Structuralist: Remarks on Manfred Frank and Romantic Subjectivity
- 9 Leaving Nature Behind, or Two Cheers for Subjectivism: On John McDowell
- Postscript: On McDowell's Response to “Leaving Nature Behind”
- PART III MODERN MORES
- PART IV EXPRESSION
- Bibliography
- Name Index
- Subject Index
4 - Gadamer's Hegel: Subjectivity and Reflection
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 June 2012
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgments
- The Persistence of Subjectivity
- 1 Introduction: “Bourgeois Philosophy” and the Problem of the Subject
- PART I SETTING
- PART II THEORISTS
- 3 Necessary Conditions for the Possibility of What Isn't: Heidegger on Failed Meaning
- 4 Gadamer's Hegel: Subjectivity and Reflection
- 5 Negative Ethics: Adorno on the Falseness of Bourgeois Life
- 6 The Unavailability of the Ordinary: Strauss on the Philosophical Fate of Modernity
- 7 Hannah Arendt and the Bourgeois Origins of Totalitarian Evil
- 8 On Not Being a Neo-Structuralist: Remarks on Manfred Frank and Romantic Subjectivity
- 9 Leaving Nature Behind, or Two Cheers for Subjectivism: On John McDowell
- Postscript: On McDowell's Response to “Leaving Nature Behind”
- PART III MODERN MORES
- PART IV EXPRESSION
- Bibliography
- Name Index
- Subject Index
Summary
So mußte vor allem Hegels Denkweg erneut befragt werden. (“Above all else, the path of Hegel's thought must be interrogated anew.”)
(GW, Bd. 2, 505)Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics is as much a reaction as an initiation: a reaction against a relativistic historicism that “locked” speakers and actors “inside” world views, a reaction against the overwhelming prestige of the natural sciences and the insistence on methodology inspired by that success, and a reaction against the “bloodless academic philosophizing” of neo-Kantian philosophy and its perennialist “great problems” approach to the history of philosophy. But in several of his autobiographical remarks, Gadamer singles out an opponent that seems to loom oddly large in his reminiscences about provocations. “Using Heidegger's analysis, my starting point was a critique of German Idealism and its Romantic traditions” (PG, 27), he writes in one such recollection. And in the same essay, he writes of trying to avoid or to “forfeit” (einbüßen) “the fundamentum inconcussum of philosophy on the basis of which Hegel had written his story of philosophy and the neo-Kantians their history of problems – namely, self-consciousness” (PG, 7). And later, “So I sought in my hermeneutics to overcome the primacy of self-consciousness, and especially the prejudices of an idealism rooted in consciousness” (PG, 27).
I want to explore in the following what Gadamer might mean by giving to hermeneutics the task of “overcoming the primacy of self-consciousness” and to ask whether it is really Hegel in his sights as he attempts to do so.
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- The Persistence of SubjectivityOn the Kantian Aftermath, pp. 79 - 97Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2005