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  • Print publication year: 2019
  • Online publication date: July 2019

7 - Holdup, Holdout, and Royalty Stacking: A Review of the Literature

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Summary

This chapter provides a critical review of the literature relating to remedies for patent infringement in the context of complex products, with a focus on the underlying theoretical issues of holdup, holdout, and royalty stacking. Issues considered here include: the conceptually appropriate benchmark for a fair return to a patentee; the theory of holdup and mechanisms by which holdup can be mitigated; placing the holdup debate within the context of property rules vs. liability rules; forcing patentees to accept lower royalties though holdout; and a review of empirical evidence related to holdup and royalty stacking.