In chapter 5, Jeff Jordan begins with an examination of the differences between Pascal’s Wager and William James’ “Will to Believe” argument. While these are both pragmatic arguments, the Wager, Jordan emphasizes, is a special case as it is not merely an argument for one particular action or belief among many, but is rather directed to what one will choose as the object of their “ultimate concern.” Jordan then considers the objections to pragmatic belief raised by W. K. Clifford and what Jamesian principles are available to subdue these objections. In particular, he challenges Clifford’s view that beliefs ought only be adopted based upon their evidential support, as well as the “Agnostic Rule” which maintains that we ought to withhold belief whenever the evidence is insufficient. Jordan then applies these principles to Pascal’s Wager, using them as part of a defense against the Many Gods Objection. He argues that wagerers do not have to consider every logically possible scenario, and can instead limit their decision matrices to only those options which they regard as “live hypotheses.”