Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Illustrations
- List of Maps
- Acknowledgements
- Glossary of terms
- Tables of military ranks and army structures
- Introduction
- Part I Strategic plans and theoretical conceptions for war against the Soviet Union
- 1 Fighting the bear
- 2 The gathering storm
- 3 Barbarossa's sword – Hitler's armed forces in 1941
- 4 The advent of war
- Part II The military campaign and the July/August crisis of 1941
- Conclusion
- Bibliography
- Index
- References
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Illustrations
- List of Maps
- Acknowledgements
- Glossary of terms
- Tables of military ranks and army structures
- Introduction
- Part I Strategic plans and theoretical conceptions for war against the Soviet Union
- 1 Fighting the bear
- 2 The gathering storm
- 3 Barbarossa's sword – Hitler's armed forces in 1941
- 4 The advent of war
- Part II The military campaign and the July/August crisis of 1941
- Conclusion
- Bibliography
- Index
- References
Summary
‘Welcome to hell on earth’
Hitler's War Directive 21 stated that preparations for the campaign against the Soviet Union were to be concluded by 15 May 1941. While planning for the eastern campaign went ahead, the wider war was developing in its own direction, rapidly engulfing the nations of south-eastern Europe, until events finally came to a head in the spring of 1941, compelling Hitler to intervene. The Balkan campaign is sometimes narrowly portrayed as Hitler's response to the successful Yugoslav coup against the regent Prince Paul, who was deposed after finally acceding to the Tripartite Pact, following months of German pressure. In truth, however, Hitler's rationale for the new campaign ultimately aimed at restoring the Axis position in the south and ensuring Germany's flank for the invasion of the Soviet Union.
Since October 1940 Mussolini had been embroiled in a disastrous attempt to invade Greece, which soon saw his beleaguered army thrown back into Albania and forced to defend itself against further Greek counter-attacks. The following months saw increasingly bold British action in the eastern Mediterranean and North Africa, leading to heavy Italian losses and the eventual Greek consent to the landing of four British divisions. The Greek hesitation in accepting direct British assistance was closely tied to their well-founded concerns about provoking Hitler, who feared the British were seeking to recreate a ‘Salonika front’ like the one that had proved such a thorn in Germany's side in 1916–1918. Of even greater concern to Hitler was the prospect that British bombers might be committed to new RAF airfields and used to strike the vital oil fields in Romania. In addition, Hitler was undoubtedly aware of the economic implications control over south-eastern Europe held for Germany. Half of Germany's cereal and livestock came from the region, 45 per cent of its bauxite (aluminium ore), 90 per cent of its tin, 40 per cent of its lead and 10 per cent of its copper. Finally, a major operation to occupy Yugoslavia and Greece would provide a somewhat more convincing explanation for the growing German military build-up in the east, helping to allay any Soviet fears of an impending attack.
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- Operation Barbarossa and Germany's Defeat in the East , pp. 139 - 150Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2009