Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Sources
- Mind, Reason and Imagination
- 1 Introduction
- PART I MIND, THEORY AND IMAGINATION
- 2 Replication and Functionalism
- 3 Understanding Other Minds from the Inside
- 4 Simulation, Theory and Content
- 5 Simulation and Cognitive Penetrability
- PART II THOUGHT AND REASON
- PART III INDEXICAL PREDICATES AND THEIR APPLICATIONS
- PART IV THINKING OF MINDS AND INTERACTING WITH PERSONS
- References
- Index
4 - Simulation, Theory and Content
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 18 December 2009
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Sources
- Mind, Reason and Imagination
- 1 Introduction
- PART I MIND, THEORY AND IMAGINATION
- 2 Replication and Functionalism
- 3 Understanding Other Minds from the Inside
- 4 Simulation, Theory and Content
- 5 Simulation and Cognitive Penetrability
- PART II THOUGHT AND REASON
- PART III INDEXICAL PREDICATES AND THEIR APPLICATIONS
- PART IV THINKING OF MINDS AND INTERACTING WITH PERSONS
- References
- Index
Summary
INTRODUCTION
Some, the theory theorists, say that when we make judgements about the psychological states of others and use such judgements to predict or explain, we employ some theory about the psychological. But others, the simulationists, say that we possess no such theory, or at least none complete enough to underpin all our competence with psychological notions. Rather, they say, what we do in such situations is ‘simulate’ others' mental states and processes in ourselves and thus gain insight into what others are likely to do.
My aim in this essay is first to offer an argument in favour of simulationism and second to suggest possible limits to the simulationist strategy. I shall suggest that simulation must be central as far as dealing with the contents of others' mental states is concerned, but is much less clearly of relevance in dealing with non-content. Thus, philosophers and psychologists should not oppose simulation to theory, but rather should ask what is the appropriate realm of each and how they interact.
The topic throughout is the nature of the fully developed adult competence with psychological notions, in the context of predicting others' future psychological states and actions on the basis of knowledge about their current psychological states. I shall not discuss the (it seems to me) importantly different question of how we arrive at judgements about others' thoughts, feelings and so on from knowledge of their placement in the environment or bodily behaviour.
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- Chapter
- Information
- Mind, Reason and ImaginationSelected Essays in Philosophy of Mind and Language, pp. 45 - 62Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2003
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