Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Sources
- Mind, Reason and Imagination
- 1 Introduction
- PART I MIND, THEORY AND IMAGINATION
- PART II THOUGHT AND REASON
- 6 Co-Cognition and Off-Line Simulation: Two Ways of Understanding the Simulation Approach
- 7 Semantic Holism: Still a Good Buy
- 8 Other Minds, Rationality and Analogy
- PART III INDEXICAL PREDICATES AND THEIR APPLICATIONS
- PART IV THINKING OF MINDS AND INTERACTING WITH PERSONS
- References
- Index
8 - Other Minds, Rationality and Analogy
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 18 December 2009
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Sources
- Mind, Reason and Imagination
- 1 Introduction
- PART I MIND, THEORY AND IMAGINATION
- PART II THOUGHT AND REASON
- 6 Co-Cognition and Off-Line Simulation: Two Ways of Understanding the Simulation Approach
- 7 Semantic Holism: Still a Good Buy
- 8 Other Minds, Rationality and Analogy
- PART III INDEXICAL PREDICATES AND THEIR APPLICATIONS
- PART IV THINKING OF MINDS AND INTERACTING WITH PERSONS
- References
- Index
Summary
INTRODUCTION
We are often in the position of knowing something about another's state of mind and wanting to know more. For example, I may know of my friend Maria (hereafter ‘M’) that she believes that p1, p2 … and pn, and has set herself to reflect on whether q; I would like to know what conclusion she has reached. Or I know something about her projects and wonder what particular moves she will take to fulfil them. Or I know that she will shortly receive certain information and wonder how she will feel about it. Or I know that she had certain visual experiences and wonder what kinds of afterimages, if any, they produced. Quite often, also, when we are curious in these sorts of ways about others' mental states we can come up with an answer. How do we do it?
Psychological states are extremely various, as are also the kinds of interactions they have with each other. I myself am extremely doubtful that there is any one story to be told about how we proceed in all cases. So the purpose of this essay is not to answer in full generality the question of how we form views on others' thoughts, but only to explore how we may articulate one particular story about how we do it in some cases, namely the cases I mentioned first, where what interests me is what M has concluded about whether q, in the light of her other beliefs.
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- Chapter
- Information
- Mind, Reason and ImaginationSelected Essays in Philosophy of Mind and Language, pp. 131 - 150Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2003
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